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Abstract
The covariance of regional consumption varies cross-sectionally and over time.
Household-level borrowing frictions can explain this aggregate phenomenon. When
the value of housing falls, loan collateral shrinks, borrowing (risk-sharing) declines,
and the sensitivity of consumption to income increases. Using panel data from 23
US metropolitan areas, we find that in times and regions where collateral is scarce,
consumption growth is about twice as sensitive to income growth. Our model aggre-
gates heterogeneous, borrowing-constrained households into regions characterized by a
common housing market. The resulting regional consumption patterns quantitatively
match the data.
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1 Introduction
The cross-sectional correlation of consumption in US metropolitan areas is much smaller
than the correlation of labor income or output. This quantity anomaly has been docu-
mented in international (e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), and Lewis (1996)) and
in regional data (e.g. Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993), Hess and Shin (2000) and Crucini
(1999)), but these unconditional moments hide a surprising amount of time variation in
the correlation of consumption across US metropolitan areas. This novel dimension of the
quantity anomaly is the focus of our paper, and we propose a housing collateral mechanism
to explain it.
On average, US regions share only a modest fraction of total region-specific income risk.
But at times this fraction is much higher than at other times: between 1975 and 1985, the
ratio of the regional cross-sectional consumption to income dispersion, a standard measure
of risk sharing, decreased by fifty percent, while it doubled between 1987 and 1992. This
stylized fact presents a new challenge to standard models, because it reveals that the
departures from complete market allocations vary substantially over time.
Conditioning on a measure of housing collateral helps to understand this aspect of the
consumption correlation puzzle, both over time and across different regions. In the data,
our measure of housing collateral scarcity broadly tracks the variation in this regional
consumption-to-income dispersion ratio. This ratio is twice as high relative to its lowest
value when collateral scarcity is at its highest value in the sample. According to our
estimates, the fraction of regional income risk that is traded away, more than doubles
when we compare the lowest to the highest collateral scarcity period in postwar US data.
We find cross-sectional evidence for the housing collateral mechanism as well. Using
regional measures of the housing collateral stock to sort regions into bins, we find that
the income elasticity of consumption growth for regions in the lowest housing collateral
quartile of US metropolitan areas is more than twice the size of the same elasticity for
areas in the highest quartile, and their consumption growth is only half as correlated with
aggregate consumption growth.
We propose an equilibrium model of household risk sharing that replicates these find-
ings. In the model, households share risk only to the extent that borrowing is collateralized
by housing wealth. This modest friction is a realistic one for an economy like the US. A
key implication of the model is that the degree of risk sharing should vary over time and
with the housing collateral ratio. Our emphasis on housing, rather than financial assets,
reflects three features of the US economy: the participation rate in housing markets is very
high (2/3 of households own their home), the value of the residential real estate makes
up over seventy-five percent of total assets for the median household (Survey of Consumer
Finances, 2001), and housing is a prime source of collateral.1
1To keep the model as simple as possible, we abstract from financial assets or other kinds of capital
(such as cars) that households may use to collateralize loans. 75 percent of household borrowing in the
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Our model reproduces the quantity anomaly. The key is to impose borrowing con-
straints at the household level and then to aggregate household consumption to the re-
gional level. First, the household constraints are much tighter than the constraints faced
by a stand-in agent at the regional level. Second, because the idiosyncratic component of
household income shocks are more negatively correlated within a region than the equilib-
rium household consumption changes that result from these shocks, aggregation produces
cross-regional consumption growth dispersion that exceeds regional income growth disper-
sion. In addition, a reduction in the supply of housing collateral tightens the household
collateral constraints, causing regional consumption growth to respond more to regional
income shocks. As a result, when we run the same consumption insurance tests on the
model’s regional consumption data, we replicate the variation in the income elasticity of
regional consumption growth that we document in the data.
Our model offers a single explanation for the apparent lack of consumption insurance
at different levels of aggregation.2 Our approach differs from that in the literature on
international risk sharing, which adopts the representative agent paradigm. That literature
typically relies on frictions impeding the international flow of capital resulting from the
government’s ability to default on international debt or to tax capital flows (e.g. Kehoe
and Perri (2002)), or resulting from transportation costs (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2003)).
Such frictions cannot account for the lack of risk sharing between regions within a country
or between households within a region. This paper shows that modest frictions at the
household level in a model with heterogenous agents within a region or country can better
our understanding of important macro puzzles.
This paper is not about a direct housing wealth effect on regional consumption: For an
average unconstrained household that is not about to move, there is no reason to consume
more when its housing value increases, simply because it has to live in a house and consume
its services (see Sinai and Souleles (2005) for a clear discussion). We find no evidence in
regional consumption data of a direct wealth effect: Regions consume more when total
regional labor income increases and this effect is larger when housing wealth is smaller
relative to human wealth in that region. We test for a separate housing wealth effect
on regional consumption, and we did not find any. In UK data, Campbell and Cocco
(2004) also find evidence in favor of a collateral effect on regional consumption, but only
in aggregate measures of housing wealth. We find direct evidence that regional measures
of housing wealth determine the sensitivity of regional consumption to regional income
shocks, as predicted by the model.
Overview and Related Literature Section 2 describes a new data set of the largest
US metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). Each MSA is a relatively homogenous region
data is collateralized by housing wealth (US Flow of Funds, 2003).
2A large literature documents that household-level consumption data are at odds with complete insurance
as well; for early work see Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991).
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in terms of rental price shocks. Since we do not have good data on the intra-regional
time-variation in housing prices, metropolitan areas are a natural choice.3
Section 3 looks at the regional consumption data though the lens of a complete markets
model, with a stand-in agent for each region. We back out regional ‘consumption wedges’
that measure the distance of the data from the complete market allocation. We then relate
the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the amount of housing collateral to the
distribution of regional consumption wedges.
This motivates section 4, which makes contact with the large empirical literature on
risk sharing that tests the null hypothesis of perfect insurance by estimating linear con-
sumption growth regressions (Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Nelson (1994), Attanasio and
Davis (1996), Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2002), and ensuing work).4 In our consump-
tion share growth regressions, the right-hand-side variable is regional income share growth
interacted with the housing collateral ratio; income and consumption shares are income
and consumption as a fraction of the aggregate, and the housing collateral ratio is the ratio
of collateralizeable housing wealth to non-collateralizeable human wealth. The interaction
term captures the collateral effect. Consistent with the regional risk-sharing literature that
uses state level data (Wincoop (1996), Hess and Shin (1998), DelNegro (1998), Asdrubali,
Sorensen and Yosha (1996), Athanasoulis and Wincoop (1998), and DelNegro (2002)), we
reject full consumption insurance among US metropolitan regions.5
More importantly, and new to this literature, we find that collateral scarcity increases
the correlation between income growth shocks and consumption growth. These collateral
effects are economically significant. When the housing collateral ratio is at its fifth per-
centile level, only thirty-five percent of regional income share shocks are insured away. In
contrast, when the housing collateral ratio is at its ninety-fifth percentile level, ninety-two
percent of regional income share shocks are insured away. As a robustness check, we repeat
the analysis for a panel of Canadian provinces, and we find similar variations in the income
elasticity of regional consumption growth associated with fluctuations in housing collateral.
Section 5 adds a regional dimension to the model of Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh
(2004) and investigates its risk-sharing implications. In the model, the effectiveness of the
household risk sharing technology endogenously varies over time due to movements in the
value of housing collateral.6 Instead, in Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2004), the focus
is on time-variation in financial risk premia. Here, we study a different implication: In
3If housing prices are strongly correlated within a region, there are only small efficiency gains from
looking at household instead of regional consumption data if the objective is to identify the collateral effect.
4Our paper also makes contact with the large literature on the excess sensitivity of consumption to
predictable income changes, starting with Flavin (1981), who interpreted her findings as evidence for bor-
rowing constraints, and followed by Hall and Mishkin (1982), Zeldes (1989), Attanasio and Weber (1995)
and Attanasio and Davis (1996), all of which examine at micro consumption data.
5Asdrubali et al. (1996) find more evidence of risk sharing among regions and states than among coun-
tries.
6Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1999) and Pavan (2005) have also developed
models that deliver this feature.
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times in which collateral is scarce, the model predicts equilibrium consumption growth
to be less strongly correlated across regions. It replicates key moments of the observed
regional consumption and income distribution. First, the average ratio of the cross-sectional
consumption dispersion to income dispersion is larger than one -the quantity anomaly-, and
this ratio increases as collateral becomes scarcer, as in the data. Second, we run the same
consumption growth regressions on model-simulated data, and replicate the results from
the data.
2 Data
We construct a new data set of US metropolitan area level macroeconomic variables, as
well as standard aggregate macroeconomic variables. All of the series are annual for the
period 1951-2002.
2.1 Aggregate Macroeconomic Data
We use two distinct measures of the nominal housing collateral stockHV : the market value
of residential real estate wealth (HV rw) and the net stock current cost value of owner-
occupied and tenant occupied residential fixed assets (HV fa). The first series is from the
Flow of Funds (Federal Board of Governors) for 1945-2002 and from the Bureau of the
Census (Historical Statistics for the US) prior to 1945. The last series is from the Fixed
Asset Tables (Bureau of Economic Analysis) for 1925-2001. Appendix C provides detailed
sources. HV rw is a measure of the value of residential housing owned by households, while
HV fa which is a measure of the total value of residential housing. Real per household
variables are denoted by lower case letters. The real, per household housing collateral
series hvrw and hvfa are constructed using the all items consumer price index from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, pa, and the total number of households from the Bureau of
the Census. Aggregate nondurable and housing services consumption, and labor income
plus transfers data are from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Real
per household labor income plus transfers is denoted by ηa, real per capita aggregate
consumption is ca.
2.2 Regional Macroeconomic Data
We construct a new panel data set for the 30 largest metropolitan areas in the US. The
regions combine for 47 percent of the US population. The metropolitan data are annual
for 1951-2002. Thirteen of the regions are metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). The other
seventeen are consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSA), comprised of adjacent
and integrated MSA’s. Most CMSA’s did not exist at the beginning of the sample. For
consistency we keep track of all constituent MSA’s and construct a population weighted
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average for the years prior to formation of the CMSA. The details concerning the con-
sumption, income and price data we use are in the data appendix C. We use regional sales
data to measure non-durable consumption. The appendix compares our new data to other
data sources that partially overlap in terms of sample period and definition, and we find
that they line up. The elimination of regions with incomplete data leaves us with annual
data for 23 metropolitan regions from 1951 until 2002. We denote real per capita regional
income and consumption by ηi and ci, and we define consumption and income shares as
the ratio of regional to aggregate consumption and income: cˆit =
cit
cat
and ηˆit =
ηit
ηat
. For
these regions we also construct a measure of regional housing collateral, combining infor-
mation on regional repeat sale price indices with Census estimates on the housing stock
(see appendix C.4 for details).
2.3 Measuring the Housing Collateral Ratio
In the model the housing collateral ratio my is defined as the ratio of collateralizable
housing wealth to non-collateralizable human wealth.7 In Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh
(2005a), we show that the log of real per household real estate wealth (loghv) and labor
income plus transfers (log η) are non-stationary in the data. This is true for both hvrw
and hvfa. We compute the housing collateral ratio as myhv = log hv − log η and remove
a constant and a trend. The resulting time series myrw and myfa are mean zero and
stationary, according to an ADF test. Formal justification for this approach comes from
a likelihood-ratio test for co-integration between loghv and log η (Johansen and Juselius
(1990)). We refer the reader to Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2005a) for details of the
estimation. For the longest available period 1925-2002, the correlation between myrw and
myfa is 0.86. The housing collateral ratios display large and persistent swings between
1925 and 2002.
In order to compare model and data more easily in the rest of the paper, we define
a re-normalized collateral ratio that it is always positive: m˜yt+1 =
mymax−myt+1
mymax−mymin . The
re-normalized housing collateral ratio m˜yt+1 is a measure of collateral scarcity ; when the
collateral ratio is at its highest point in the sample m˜y = 0, whereas a reading of 1 means
that collateral is at its lowest level. The regional housing collateral ratios for each metropol-
itan area are constructed in the same way from regional housing wealth and regional income
measures.
7Human wealth is an unobservable. We assume that the non-stationary component of human wealth H is
well approximated by the non-stationary component of labor income Y . In particular, log (Ht) = log(Yt)+²t,
where ²t is a stationary random process. This is the case if the expected return on human capital is
stationary (see Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Campbell (1996)). The housing collateral ratio then is
measured as the deviation from the co-integration relationship between the value of the aggregate housing
collateral measure and aggregate labor income.
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3 Regional Consumption Wedges
In this section and the next section, we establish the main stylized fact of the paper, that
risk sharing across regions is better when housing collateral is more abundant. This section
takes a first look at the data through the lens of the benchmark complete markets model
with a single stand-in agent for each region. We back out the deviations from complete
market allocations, and we label those deviations regional ‘consumption wedges’.8 The
time-variation in the distribution of these wedges will guide us towards the right theory.
Environment We let st denote the history of regional and aggregate income shocks.
The stand-in household in a region ranks non-housing and housing consumption streams
{ct(st)} and {ht(st)} according to
U(c, h) =
∑
st|s0
∞∑
t=0
βtpi(st|s0)u(ct(st), ht(st)), (1)
where β is the time discount factor, common to all regions. The households have power
utility over a CES-composite consumption good:
u(ct, ht) =
1
1− γ
[
c
ε−1
ε
t + ψh
ε−1
ε
t
] (1−γ)ε
ε−1
,
The preference parameter ψ > 0 converts the housing stock into a service flow, γ is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ε is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution
between non-durable and housing services consumption.9
Complete Risk Sharing In a complete markets environment, we expect the stand-in
households in any two different regions i and i′ to equalize their weighted marginal utility
from non-durable consumption in all states of the world (st, s′):
µiuc(cit+1(s
t, s′), hit+1(s
t, s′)) = µi
′
uc(ci
′
t+1(s
t, s′), hi
′
t+1(s
t, s′)),
where µi is the inverse of the Lagrange multiplier on the time zero budget constraint. This
condition is violated in the data, but, more importantly, we show that the distance from
the actual allocations in the data to these complete market allocations varies dramatically
over time.
8The stand-in agent is merely used as a convenient way to describe some moments of the data, because
it is the reference model in this literature (e.g. Lewis (1995)). In our model, we will start at the household
level and explicitly aggregate up to the regional level.
9These preferences belong to the class of homothetic power utility functions of Eichenbaum and Hansen
(1990). Here we will focus on the special case of separability: γε = 1. A separately available appendix
extends the analysis to non-separable utility.
6
3.1 Consumption Wedges and the Aggregate Housing Collateral Ratio
The regional consumption wedges κ are defined to satisfy the standard complete markets
restriction on the level of marginal utility across different regions:
µi
κit+1
uc(cit+1(s
t, s′), hit+1(s
t, s′)) =
µi
′
κi
′
t+1
uc(ci
′
t+1(s
t, s′), hi
′
t+1(s
t, s′)).
They measure the implicit regional consumption tax τ it+1 necessary to explain observed
consumption
κit+1
µi
= (1 + τ it+1). The consumption wedges trace the deviations from the
complete market allocations.
Computing the Wedges We focus on the case of separability ε = 1/γ and set γ = 2
for all regions. To keep it simple, we normalize all initial regional weights µi to one. In
this environment, complete markets implies constant and equal consumption shares. Now
we simply feed in observed regional consumption share data {cˆit}t=1,Ti=1,N , and compute the
implied consumption wedges κit+1 =
(
cˆit+1
)−γ .
The Distribution of Regional Consumption Wedges in Data In our 1951-2002
metropolitan data set, income growth is more strongly correlated across regions than
consumption growth. The time average of the cross-sectional correlation of consumption
growth is 0.27, about half of the cross-correlation of labor income growth of 0.48. This is
the well known quantity anomaly.
More surprising is the strong time variation in the size of the regional consumption
wedges. The upper panels of figure 1 plot the cross-sectional standard deviation (left
box) and cross-sectional average (right box) of the regional wedges (dashed line) against
our measure of housing collateral scarcity (full line, measured against the left axis). The
average consumption tax varies between zero and four percent and the standard deviation
varies between 14 and 22 percent. While there is quite some variation at business cycle
frequencies, the low frequency variation dominates and seems to track the housing collateral
ratio. The turning points in the housing market (1960, 1974, 1991) all coincide with turning
points in the cross-sectional distribution of these consumption wedges. Comparing the year
with the lowest collateral scarcity measure (2002), and the year with the highest collateral
scarcity measure (1974) is even more informative: The mean consumption tax increases
from one percent (2002) to four percent (1974), while the standard deviation increases from
16 to 22 percent.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Normalizing Consumption Wedges Next, we normalize the moments of the regional
consumption wedges by the same moments of the wedges that would arise in an autarchic
economy (no risk sharing). These autarchic wedges are computed by feeding observed
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regional income share data {η̂it}t=1,Ti=1,N into the definition of the wedges: κi,autt+1 =
(
η̂it+1
)−γ .
This normalization filters out the effects of changes in the distribution of regional income
shocks at business cycle frequencies; the cross-sectional dispersion of regional income shocks
increases in recessions. In the lower panels of figure 1, we plot the normalized moments of
the consumption wedges. The average consumption wedge (right box, dashed line) tends
to increase relative to the autarchic one when collateral is scarce. In addition, there is a lot
more cross-sectional variation in the consumption wedges relative to the autarchic wedges
(left box). In sum, the average US region experiences much higher marginal utility than
predicted by the complete markets model when the housing collateral ratio is low. At the
same time there is much more cross-sectional variation in marginal utility levels as well.
Underlying Changes in Consumption Distribution In figure 2, we plot the changes
in the consumption distribution that underly these changes in the distribution of consump-
tion wedges. The dashed line in the left panel plots the cross-sectional consumption share
dispersion (measured against the right axis); the solid line plots our empirical measure of
collateral scarcity (measured against the left axis). The turning points in the cross-sectional
dispersion of regional consumption coincide with the turning points in our collateral scarcity
measure, especially in the second part of the sample. In the right panel of the figure, we
control for changes in income dispersion. The ratio of consumption dispersion to income
dispersion is twice as high when is at its lowest value in the sample as when my is at its
highest value in the sample (1.79 in 1974 versus .83 in 2002, right panel).10
[Figure 2 about here.]
Changes in Regional Consumption Wedges We also looked at the growth rate of
these consumption wedges
κit+1
κit
. These rates can be backed out of the growth rate of
consumption shares in the data:
κit
κit+1
uc(cˆit+1(s
t, s′))
uc(cˆit(st))
=
κi
′
t
κi
′
t+1
uc(cˆi
′
t+1(s
t, s′))
uc(cˆi
′
t (st))
.
The standard deviation of the changes in the consumption wedges decreases from 12
percent in 1974 to 7 percent in 2002. This reflects the underlying decrease in the standard
deviation of consumption share growth across US regions from 6 percent in 1974 to 3.5
percent in 2002. This is remarkable given that the standard deviation of income share
growth rates increased from 1.8 percent to 3.7 percent.
In section 5, we produce a model with heterogenous households within a region that
delivers the same pattern in these regional consumption wedges. The next section shows
10Clearly, there were other important advances in financial markets that may have contributed to these
changes, in particular the increase in non-secured household debt and the deepening and regional integration
of mortgage markets starting in the seventies. We return to the latter in the conclusion.
8
that there is a lot of cross-sectional variation in housing collateral ratios as well and it
supports our mechanism.
3.2 Regional Collateral Scarcity and Consumption Wedges
To explore the cross-sectional variation, we sort the 23 MSA’s by their collateral ratio
in each year and we look at average population-weighted consumption growth and income
growth for the 6 regions with the lowest and the 6 regions with the highest regional collateral
ratio. The regional housing collateral ratio is measured in the same way as the aggregate
housing collateral ratio (see appendix C.4 for details).
Table 1 shows the results. Regions in the first quartile (highest collateral scarcity, m˜yi
is 0.84 on average, reported in column 1) experience more volatile consumption growth
(column 2) that is only half as correlated with US aggregate consumption growth (column
3) than for the group with the most abundant collateral (m˜yi is 0.26 on average). The last
three columns report the result of a time-series regression of group-averaged consumption
share growth on group-averaged income share growth. The income elasticity of consump-
tion share growth is 0.66 (with t-stat 1.9) for the group with the most scarce collateral,
whereas it is only 0.31 (with t-stat 1.3) for the group with the most abundant collateral.
For the first group full insurance can be rejected, whereas for the last group it cannot.
[Table 1 about here.]
4 Linear Model for Regional Consumption Growth Wedges
The housing collateral ratio seems to be an important driving force behind the size of the
consumption wedges. In this section we explore this possibility in the data. We assume
the growth rate of the regional consumption wedge is linear in the product of the housing
collateral ratio and the regional income share shock: ∆ log κˆit+1 = −γm˜yt+1∆ log ηˆit+1,
where κˆi is region i’s consumption wedge, in deviation from the cross-sectional average.
All growth rates of hatted variables denote the growth rates in the region in deviation from
the cross-regional average, and the averages are population-weighted. When we impose
separability on the utility function, this assumption delivers a linear consumption growth
equation:
∆ log cˆit+1 = m˜yt+1∆log ηˆ
i
t+1.
The consumption growth equation simply involves regional income share growth inter-
acted with the collateral ratio. The interpretation is simple. If m˜yt+1 is zero, there is no
consumption wedge and this region’s consumption growth equals aggregate consumption
growth. On the other hand, if m˜yt+1 is one, this region’s consumption wedge is at its
largest, and the region is in autarchy: its non-housing consumption cit (growth) equals
its labor income ηit (growth). So, the model-implied correlation between the consumption
share and the income share depends on the collateral ratio.
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The consumption growth equation links our model to the traditional risk-sharing tests
based on linear consumption growth regressions, the workhorse of the consumption insur-
ance literature. The next section delivers a formal theory of consumption wedges that ties
the distribution of wedges to the housing collateral ratio. We show there that this linear
specification of the consumption wedges actually works well inside the model.
4.1 Estimation of the Linear Model
We consider two different specifications of the consumption growth regressions. In all
regressions, we include regional fixed effects to pick up unobserved heterogeneity across
regions, and we take into account measurement error in non-durable consumption. We
express observed consumption shares with a tilde and assume that income shares are mea-
sured without error. The linear model collapses to the following equation for observed
consumption shares c˜:
∆ log
(
c˜it+1
)
= ai0 + a1m˜yt+1∆log
(
ηˆit+1
)
+ νit+1,
where the left hand side variable is observed consumption share growth and ai0 are region-
specific fixed effects. All measurement error terms are absorbed in νit+1. This equation
resembles the standard consumption growth equation in the consumption literature, except
for the collateral interaction term. We refer to this equation as ‘Specification I’.
Estimation Specifics We assume that the measurement error in regional consumption
share growth, νit , is orthogonal to lagged values housing collateral ratio: E
[
νitm˜yt−k
]
=
0, ∀k ≥ 0. Since only aggregate variables affect the aggregate housing collateral ratio my
and only region-specific measurement error enters in νi, this assumption follows naturally
from the theory.
The benchmark estimation method is generalized least squares (GLS), which takes into
account cross-sectional correlation in the residuals νi and heteroscedasticity. If the residuals
and regressors are correlated, the GLS estimators of the parameters in the consumption
growth regressions are inconsistent. To address this possibility, we report instrumental
variables estimation results (by three-stage least squares) in addition to the GLS results.
Because of the autoregressive nature of m˜y, we use two, three and four-period leads of
the dependent and independent variables as instruments (Arellano and Bond (1991)). In
the empirical work, we construct m˜y by setting mymax and mymin equal to the 1925-2002
sample maximum and minimum.
Results The GLS and IV estimates of this specification are reported table 2, in the panel
labeled ‘Specification I’. The first two lines report the results for the entire sample 1952-
2002 and two different collateral measures. Lines 3-4 report the results for the 1970-2002
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sub-sample; lines 5-6 use labor income plus transfers, only available for 1970-2000, instead
of disposable income. Finally, lines 7-8 report the IV estimates.
[Table 2 about here.]
Full Insurance Rejected The null hypothesis of full insurance among US regions, H0 :
a1 = 0 in panel A, is strongly rejected. The p-value for a Wald test is 0.00 for all rows in
table 2. This is consistent with the findings of the regional risk-sharing literature for US
states (see e.g. Hess and Shin (1998)). Across the board, in all the specifications (see rows
of panel A), a1 is positive and measured precisely. The point estimate for a1 has a simple
interpretation when the support of m˜y is symmetric around 0.5 and the current period
m˜yt+1 = 0.5:
a1
2 measures the fraction of income growth shocks that the regions cannot
insure away in an average period. Over the entire sample, between 33 percent (row 1)
and 37 percent of disposable income growth shocks end up in consumption growth, while
two-thirds of shocks are insured away on average.
Collateral Channel More importantly, the correlation of region-specific consumption
growth and region-specific income growth is higher when housing collateral is scarce. The
empirical distribution of the housing collateral ratio allows us to gauge the extent of time
variation in the degree of risk sharing. The fifth percentile value for myrw and the coef-
ficient on a1 in row 1 imply a degree of risk-sharing of 34.6 percent. The 95th percentile
implies a degree of risk-sharing of 91.5 percent. Likewise, for myfa the risk-sharing in-
terval is [35.9, 92.4] percent. The coefficient estimates for the period 1970-2000 are only
slightly higher (rows 3-4, panel A). The point estimates for a1 are higher when we use labor
income growth instead of disposable income growth (rows 5-6). The risk-sharing intervals
are [5, 88] percent for row 5 and [8, 89] percent for row 6. All of these point estimates imply
large shocks to the regional risk sharing technology in the US induced by changes in the
housing collateral ratio.
Instrumental Variable Estimates Rows 7-8 of table 2 report instrumental variable
estimates where income changes are instrumented by 2 and 3-period leads of independent
and dependent variables. The instrumental variables estimates reject full insurance, and
the coefficient estimates are close to the ones obtained by GLS. Again, these lend support
to the collateral channel.
Separate Income Term The second specification we consider guards against the pos-
sibility that we are only picking up the effects of income changes, not the collateral effect
itself. We re-estimate the consumption growth equation with a separate regional income
growth term:
∆ log
(
c˜it+1
)
= bi0 + b1∆log
(
yˆit+1
)
+ b2myt+1∆log
(
yˆit
)
+ νit+1.
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This in fact the same equation, because it contains the actual collateral ratiomyt+1, not the
re-scaled collateral scarcity measure m˜yt+1. The parameter b1 in the second specification
corresponds to a1 my
max
mymax−mymin in the first specification and the coefficient b2 corresponds
to −a1 1mymax−mymin . These results are in panel B of table 2, under the heading ‘Specifi-
cation II’. Essentially these results confirm the previous findings. The null hypothesis of
full insurance is H0 : b1 = b2 = 0 in panel B. It is strongly rejected. These estimates con-
firm that the correlation of region-specific consumption growth and region-specific income
growth is lower when housing collateral is abundant: b2 < 0 is negative in all rows. The
coefficient b2 is estimated precisely. The coefficients b1 and b2 imply that two-thirds of
income shocks are insured away on average, but that there is substantial time variation in
the degree of risk sharing depending on the level of the collateral ratio. These estimates
imply that in the sample the slope coefficients vary between .45, when my = mymin, and
.28, when my = mymin, using myrw as the collateral measure.
Non-separable Utility Our previous results are robust to the inclusion of expenditure
share growth terms which arise from the non-separability of the utility function. The point
estimates for the slope coefficients on income growth interacted with the collateral ratio
are very similar, but the expenditure share growth terms are not significant. The results
are reported in a separate appendix, downloadable from the authors’ web sites. In what
follows, we abstract from non-separabilities.
4.2 Estimation of the Linear Model using Regional Collateral Measures
Sofar we have used the aggregate housing collateral measure only. This section briefly
discusses the empirical relationship between the regional consumption wedges and two
regional measures of collateral. Table 3 presents results for the case of separable preferences:
∆ log
(
cˆit+1
)
= bi0 + b1∆log
(
ηˆit+1
)
+ b2Xit+1∆log
(
ηˆit+1
)
+ νit+1,
where Xi is the home-ownership rate in region i in the first row and the regional housing
collateral ratio myi in the second row. For both variables, we find that the correlation
between consumption and income share growth is lower when the region-specific collateral
measure is higher. The effects are large and the coefficients are precisely measured. For
example, a one standard deviation increase in the region-specific housing collateral ratio
(Xi = myi) in row 2 increases the degree of risk-sharing by ten percent (from 60 to 66%).
The region-specific collateral measures vary between -.25 and .25. The implied difference
in the degree of risk sharing (the width of the risk-sharing interval) is 28.5%.
In the third row of the table, we add the regional collateral measure as a separate
regressor, to check for a regional housing wealth effect on consumption. The coefficient,
b3, is significant, but it has the wrong sign. After controlling for the risk-sharing role
of housing, we find no separate increase in regional consumption growth when regional
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housing collateral becomes more abundant. Rather, the wealth effect goes the wrong way.
Finally, we also used bankruptcy indicators as a regional collateral measure and found
that they were insignificant. US states have different levels of homestead exemptions that
households can invoke upon declaring bankruptcy under Chapter 7. We used both the
amount of the exemption and a dummy for MSA’s in a state with an exemption level
above $20, 000. In neither regression did we find a significant coefficient.
[Table 3 about here.]
4.3 Canadian Data
As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis with data from Canadian provinces. While
we only have data available for ten provinces from 1981-2003, the consumption data are
arguably more standard: Non-durable consumption (personal expenditures on goods and
services less expenditures on durable goods) instead of retail sales. The income measure
is personal disposable income. We construct real per capita consumption and income
shares, using the provincial CPI series. The housing wealth series measure the market
value of the net stock of fixed residential capital, a measure corresponding to hvfa. These
housing wealth series are available for Canada, as well as for the ten provinces. The housing
collateral ratio is constructed in the same way as for the U.S. data. Appendix C.5 describes
these data in more detail.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 confirms our finding for the U.S. that the degree of risk-sharing varies sub-
stantially with the housing collateral ratio. In the first two rows, we use the aggregate
collateral ratio. Since m˜yfa is .5 on average and myfa is zero on average, they show
that Canadian provinces share 85% of income risk on average. This is higher than in the
U.S., presumably because there is more government redistribution. More importantly, the
degree of risk sharing varies over time. When housing collateral is at its lowest point in
the sample (in 1985), only 63% of income risk is shared, whereas in 2003, the degree of
risk-sharing is 95%. In rows 3 and 4 we use the same collateral measure, but now measured
at the regional level. Again we find a precisely estimated slope coefficient with the right
sign. Lastly, we confirm our finding for the U.S. data, that these results are not driven by
a wealth effect. In row 4, the coefficient on the housing collateral ratio b3 shows up with
the wrong sign. In the rest of the paper, we build a model to understand these fluctuations
in risk-sharing. The empirical results for the U.S. will be our target.
5 A Theory of Time-Varying Consumption Wedges
The empirical distribution of consumption wedges discussed in section 3 and the linear
consumption wedge regressions of section 4 confirm that the degree of risk sharing varies
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over time in unison with the housing collateral ratio. In this section we provide a model
that can replicate this feature of the data.
A version of this model was first developed in Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2004). It
is a dynamic general equilibrium model that approximates the modest frictions inhibiting
perfect risk-sharing in advanced economies like the US. The model is based on two ideas:
that debts can only be enforced to the extent that they can be collateralized, and that
the primary source of collateral is housing. First, we relax the assumption in the Lucas
endowment economy that contracts are perfectly enforceable, following Alvarez and Jer-
mann (2000). As in Lustig (2003), we allow households to file for bankruptcy. Second,
each household owns part of the housing stock. Housing provides both utility services and
collateral services. When a household chooses not to honor its debt repayments, it loses all
housing collateral but its labor income is protected from creditors. Defaulting households
regain immediate access to credit markets. The lack of commitment gives rise to collateral
constraints whose tightness depends on the relative abundance of housing collateral.
The key friction, collateralized borrowing, operates at the household level. The model
here differs from Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2004) in that it adds a regional dimen-
sion. Regions differ in their housing services endowment and housing services cannot be
transported across regions. Our main purpose is to show how the regional aggregates in
the model, constructed by aggregating household data, behave like those in the data. A
calibrated version of the model replicates the time-series and cross-regional variation in the
degree or risk sharing observed in the data.
The section starts with a description of the environment in 5.1 and market structure
in 5.2. We then provide a characterization of equilibrium allocations using consumption
shares in section 5.3. The model gives rise to a simple, non-linear risk-sharing rule. We
show that the household collateral constraints give rise to tighter constraints at the regional
level in 5.4. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 calibrate and simulate the model, first without and then
with aggregate uncertainty. We estimate the linear consumption growth regressions of
section 4 on model-generated data.
5.1 Uncertainty, Preferences and Endowments
We consider an economy with a continuum of regions. There are two types of infinitely
lived households in each of these regions, and households cannot move between regions.
Uncertainty There are three layers of uncertainty: an event s consists of x, y, and z.
We use st to denote the history of events st = (xt, yt, zt), where xt ∈ Xt denotes the history
of household events, yt ∈ Y t denotes the history of regional events and zt ∈ Zt denotes the
history of aggregate events. pi(st|s0) denotes the probability of history st, conditional on
observing s0.
The household-level event x is first-order Markov, and the x shocks are independently
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and identically (henceforth i.i.d.) distributed across regions. In our calibration below, x
takes on one of two values, high (hi) or low (lo). When x = hi, the first household in that
region is in the high state, and, the second household is in the low state. When x = lo, the
first household is in the low state. The region-level event y is also first-order Markov and
it is i.i.d. across regions. We will appeal to a law of large numbers (LLN) when integrating
across households in different regions.11
Preferences The households j in each region i rank consumption plans consisting of
(non-durable) non-housing consumption
{
cijt (s
t)
}
and housing services
{
hijt (s
t)
}
according
to the objective function in equation (1).
Endowments Each of the households, indexed by j, in a region, indexed by i, is en-
dowed with a claim to a labor income stream
{
ηijt (xt, yt, z
t)
}
. The aggregate non-housing
endowment
{
ηat (z
t)
}
is the sum of the household endowments in all regions:
ηat (z
t) =
∑
yt
piz(yt)ηit(yt, z
t)
where piz(yt) denotes the fraction of regions that draws aggregate state z. Likewise, the
regional non-housing endowment
{
ηit(yt, z
t)
}
is the sum of the individual endowments of
the households in that region:
ηit(yt, z
t) =
∑
j=1,2
ηijt (xt, yt, z
t).
The left hand side does not depend on xt, because the two household endowments always
sum to the regional endowment, regardless of whether the first household is in the high or
the low state.
Each region i receives a share of the aggregate non-housing endowment denoted by
ηˆit(yt, zt) À 0. Thus, regional income shares are defined as in the empirical section:
ηˆit(yt, zt) =
ηit(yt,z
t)
ηat (z
t) . Household j’s labor endowment share in region i, measured as a
fraction of the regional endowment share, is denoted ˆˆηjt (xt)À 0. The shares add up to one
within each region: ˆˆη1t (xt) + ˆˆη
2
t (xt) = 1. The level of the labor endowment of household j
in region i can be written as:
ηijt (xt, yt, z
t) = ˆˆηjt (xt)ηˆ
i
t(yt, zt)η
a
t (z
t).
In addition, each region is endowed with a stochastic stream of non-negative housing
services χit(y
t, zt) À 0. In contrast to non-housing consumption, the housing services
cannot be transported across regions. We will come back to the assumptions we make on
11The usual caveat applies when applying the LLN; we implicitly assume the technical conditions outlined
by Uhlig (1996) are satisfied.
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χi at the end of section 5.3. So far, we have made the following assumptions about the
endowment processes:
Assumption 1. The household-specific labor endowment share ˆˆηj only depends on xt. The
regional income share ηˆit only depends on (yt, zt). The events (x, y, z) follow a first-order
Markov process.
5.2 Trading
We set up an Arrow-Debreu economy where all trade takes place at time zero, after observ-
ing the initial state s0.12 We denote the present discounted value of any endowment stream
{d} after a history st as Πst [{dτ (sτ )}], defined by
∑
sτ |st
∑∞
τ=t
[
pτ
(
sτ |st) dτ (sτ |st)], where
pt(st) denotes the Arrow-Debreu price of a unit of non-housing consumption in history st.
Households in each region purchase a complete, state-contingent consumption plan{
cijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t), hijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t)
}∞
t=0
where θij0 denotes initial non-labor wealth.
13 They are subject to a single time zero bud-
get constraint which states that the present discounted value of non-housing and housing
consumption must not exceed the present discounted value of the labor income stream and
the initial non-labor wealth:
Πs0
[{
cijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t) + ρi(st)hijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t)
}]
6 θij0 +Πs0
[{
ηij0 (s
t)
}]
, (2)
Collateral Constraints In this time-zero-trading economy, collateral constraints re-
strict the value of a household’s consumption claim net of its labor income claim to be
non-negative:
Πst
[{
cijτ (θ
ij
0 , s
τ ) + ρiτ (s
τ )hijτ (θ
ij
0 , s
τ )
}]
≥ Πsτ
[{
ηijτ (xτ , yτ , z
τ )
}]
. (3)
The left hand side denotes the value of adhering to the contract following node st; the right
hand side the value of default. Default implies the loss of all housing collateral wealth, and
a fresh start with the present value of future labor income. The households in each region
are subject to a sequence of collateral constraints, one for each state st. These constraints
are not too tight, in the sense of Alvarez and Jermann (2000), in an environment where
agents cannot be excluded from trading, e.g. because they can hide (see Lustig (2003) for
a formal proof).
12Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2004) describes an equivalent decentralization where all trade takes place
sequentially.
13θij0 denotes the value of household j’s initial claim to housing wealth, as well as any other financial
wealth that is in zero net aggregate supply. We refer to this as non-labor wealth. The initial distribution
of non-labor wealth is denoted Θ0.
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These constraints differ from the typical solvency constraints that decentralize con-
strained efficient allocations in environments with exclusion from trading upon default.14
If we imposed exclusion from trading instead, the solvency constraints would be looser on
average, but the same mechanism would operate. The reason is that in autarchy the house-
hold would still have to buy housing services with its endowment of non-housing goods.
An increase in the relative price of housing services would worsen the outside option and
loosen the solvency constraints, as it does in our model.
Kehoe-Levine Equilibrium The definition of an equilibrium is straightforward. We
simply check that the allocations solve the household problem and that the markets clear
in all states of the world.
Definition 2. A Kehoe-Levine equilibrium is a list of allocations {cijt (θij0 , st)}, {hijt (θij0 , st)}
and prices {ρit(st)}, {pt(st)} such that, for a given initial distribution Θ0 over non-labor
wealth holdings and initial states (θ0, s0), (i) the allocations solve the household problem,
(ii) the markets for non-housing and housing consumption clear:
Consumption markets clear for all t, zt:
∑
j=1,2
∑
xt,yt
∫
cijt (θ
ij
0 , x
t, yt, zt)
pi(xt, yt, zt|x0, y0, z0)
pi(zt|z0) dΘ0 = η
a
t (z
t)
Housing markets in each region i clear for all t, xt, yt, zt:∑
j=1,2
hijt (θ
ij
0 , x
t, yt, zt) = χit(y
t, zt).
5.3 Equilibrium Allocations
To characterize the equilibrium consumption dynamics we use stochastic consumption
weights that describe the consumption of each household as a fraction of the aggregate
endowment (see appendix A for a complete derivation). Instead of solving a social plan-
ner problem, we characterize equilibrium allocations and prices directly off the household’s
necessary and sufficient first order conditions. The household problem is a standard convex
problem: the objective function is concave and the constraint set is convex. In equilibrium,
for any two households j and j′ in any two regions i and i′, the level of marginal utilities
satisfies:
ξijt+1uc(c
ij
t+1(θ
ij
0 , s
t, s′), hijt+1(θ
ij
0 , s
t, s′)) = ξi
′j′
t+1uc(c
i′j′
t+1(θ
i′j′
0 , s
t, s′), hi
′j′
t+1(θ
i′j′
0 , s
t, s′)),
14Most other authors in this literature take the outside option upon default to be exclusion from future
participation in financial markets (e.g. Kehoe and Levine (1993), Krueger (2000), Krueger and Perri (2003),
and Kehoe and Perri (2002)).
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at any node (st, s′), where ξij is the consumption weight of household j in region i.
These consumption weights are the household level counterpart of the regional consump-
tion wedges we defined in section 3. Our model provides an equilibrium theory of these
consumption wedges.
Cutoff Rule The equilibrium dynamics of the consumption weights or wedges are non-
linear ; in particular they follow a simple cutoff rule. This cutoff characterization follows
from the first order conditions of the constrained optimization problem in the time-zero-
trading setup described above. We focus here on equilibrium allocations in the model where
preferences over non-durable consumption and housing services are separable (γε = 1).
The weights start off at ξij0 = ν
ij at time zero; this initial weight is the multiplier
on the initial promised utility constraints (see appendix A). The new weight ξijt of a
generic household ij that enters period t with weight ξijt−1 equals the old weight as long
as the household does not switch to a state with a binding collateral constraint. When a
household enters a state with a binding constraint, its new weight ξijt is re-set to a cutoff
weight ξ
t
(xt, yt, zt).
ξ˜ijt (ν
ij , st) =
{
ξijt−1 if ξ
ij
t−1 > ξt(xt, yt, z
t)
ξ
t
(xt, yt, zt) if ξ
ij
t−1 ≤ ξt(xt, yt, zt)
(4)
ξ
t
(xt, yt, zt) is the consumption weight at which the collateral constraint (3) holds with
equality. It does not depend on the entire history of household-specific and region-specific
shocks (xt, yt), only the current shock (xt, yt). This amnesia property crucially depends on
assumption 1. The reason is simple: the right hand side of the collateral constraint in (3)
only depends on the current shock (xt, yt) when the constraint binds. This immediately
implies that household ij consumption shares cannot depend on the region’s history of
shocks (see proposition 6 in appendix A for a formal proof).
The consumption in node st of household ij is fully pinned down by this cutoff rule:
cijt (s
t) =
(
ξijt (ν
ij , st)
) 1
γ
ξat (zt)
cat (z
t). (5)
Its consumption as a fraction of aggregate consumption equals the ratio of its individual
stochastic consumption weight ξijt raised to the power
1
γ to the aggregate consumption
weight ξat . This aggregate consumption weight is computed by integrating over the new
household weights across all households, at aggregate node zt:
ξat (z
t) =
∑
j=1,2
∑
xt,yt
∫ (
ξijt (ν
i,j , st)
) 1
γ pi(xt, yt, zt|x0, y0, z0)
pi(zt|z0) dΦ
j
0, (6)
where Φj0 is the cross-sectional joint distribution over initial household consumption weights
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ν and the initial shocks (x0, y0) for households of type j = 1, 2. By the law of large numbers,
the aggregate weight process only depends on the aggregate history zt.
The risk sharing rule for non-housing consumption in (5) clears the market for non-
durable consumption by construction, because the re-normalization of consumption weights
by the aggregate consumption weight ξat guarantees that the consumption shares integrate
to one across regions. It follows immediately from (4), (5), and (6) that in a stationary equi-
librium, each household’s consumption share is drifting downwards as long as it does not
switch to a state with a binding constraint, while the consumption share of the constrained
households jump up. The rate of decline of the consumption share for all unconstrained
households is the same, and equal to the aggregate weight shock gt+1 ≡ ξat+1/ξat . When
none of the households is constrained between nodes zt and zt+1, the aggregate weight
shock gt+1 equals one. In all other nodes, the aggregate weight shock is strictly greater
than one. The risk-sharing rule for housing services is linear as well:
hijt (s
t) =
(
ξijt (ν
ij , st)
) 1
γ
ξit(xt, yt, zt)
χit(yt, z
t), (7)
where the denominator is now the regional weight shock, defined as
ξit(x
t, yt, zt) =
∑
j=1,2
(
ξijt (ν
ij , st)
) 1
γ
.
The appendix verifies that this rule clears the housing market in each region.
In the case of non-separable preferences between non-housing and housing consumption
(γε 6= 1), the equilibrium consumption allocations also follow a cutoff rule, similar to the
one in equations (4), (5), and (7). In this case, the consumption weight changes when the
non-housing expenditure share changes, even if the region does not enter a state with a
binding constraint. The derivation is in a separate appendix, available on our web sites.
Equilibrium State Prices In each date and state, random payoffs are priced by the
unconstrained household, who have the highest intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
(see Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). The price of a unit of a consumption in state st+1 in
units of st consumption is their intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, which can be
read off directly from the risk sharing rule in (5):
pt+1(st+1)
pt(st)pi(st+1|st) = β
(
cat+1
cat
)−γ
gγt+1. (8)
This derivation relies only on the invariance of the unconstrained household’s weight be-
tween t and t+1. The first part is the representative agent pricing kernel under separability.
The collateral constraints contribute a second factor to the stochastic discount factor, the
aggregate weight shock raised to the power γ.
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Regional Rental Prices The equilibrium relative price of housing services in region i,
ρi, equals the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and housing services of
the households in that region:
ρit(y
t, zt) =
uh(c
ij
t (θ
ij
0 , s
t), hijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t))
uc(c
ij
t (θ
ij
0 , s
t), hijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t))
= ψ
(
hijt
cijt
)−1
ε
= ψ
(
ξat
ξit
χit
cat
)−1
ε
. (9)
The second equality follows from the CES utility kernel; the last equality substitutes in the
equilibrium risk sharing rules (5) and (7). Because each region consumes its own housing
services endowment, the rental price is in principle region-specific and depends on the
region-specific shocks yt.
Non-Housing Expenditure Shares Using the risk sharing rule under separable utility,
it is easy to show that the non-housing expenditure share is the same for all households j
in region i (see appendix A):
cijt
cijt + ρ
i
th
ij
t
≡ αijt = αit
In the calibration, we focus on the case of a perfectly elastic supply of housing services
at the regional level. To do so, we impose an additional restriction on the regional housing
endowments.
Assumption 3. The regional housing endowments χit are chosen such that
ξit
ξat
cat (z
t) =
κχit(y
t, zt), for some constant κ and for all yt, zt.
The equilibrium expenditure shares αi are a function of the aggregate history zt only:
αit = αt(z
t). Likewise, rental prices only depend on zt.
Tightness of the Collateral Constraints Because of the collateral constraints, labor
income shocks cannot be fully insured in spite of the full set of consumption claims that
can be traded. How much risk sharing the economy can accomplish depends on the ratio
of aggregate housing collateral wealth to non-collateralizeable human wealth. Integrating
housing wealth and human across all households in all regions, that ratio can be written
as:
Πzt
[{
cat (z
t)
(
1
αt(zt)
− 1
)}]
Πzt [{cat (zt)}]
, (10)
where in the numerator we used the assumption that the housing expenditure shares are
identical across regions. In the model, we define the collateral ratio myt(zt) as the ratio of
housing wealth to total wealth:
myt(zt) =
Πzt
[{
cat (z
t)
(
1
αt(zt)
− 1
)}]
Πzt
[{
cat (zt)
1
αt(zt)
}] .
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If the aggregate non-housing expenditure share is constant, the collateral ratio is constant
at 1 − α. Suppose the aggregate endowment ηa = ca is constant as well. Then my or α
index the risk-sharing capacity of the economy. When α = 1, my = 0 is zero and there
is no collateral in the economy. All the collateral constraints necessarily bind at all nodes
and households are in autarchy.15 On the other hand, as α becomes sufficiently small, my
becomes sufficiently large, and perfect risk sharing becomes feasible, because the solvency
constraints no longer bind in any of the nodes st.
In section 5.5 we investigate equilibria where the aggregate endowment is constant;
each equilibrium is indexed by a different housing collateral ratio my, or equivalently an
expenditure ratio α: my = 1 − α. In section 5.6, we generalize the analysis and let the
expenditure share be a function of the aggregate state zt.
5.4 Tighter Constraints
In our model, a region is just a unit of aggregation. We define regional consumption as the
sum of household consumption:
cit(θ
i1
0 , θ
i2
0 , y
t, zt) =
∑
j=1,2
cijt (θ
ij
0 , x
t, yt, zt).
The regional consumption share is defined as a fraction of total non-durable consumption,
as in the empirical analysis: cˆit =
cit
cat
.
The constraints faced by these households are tighter than those faced by a stand-in
agent, who consumes regional consumption and earns regional labor income, in each region:
By the linearity of the pricing functional Π(·), the aggregated regional collateral constraint
for region i is just the sum of the household collateral constraints over households j in
region i:∑
j=1,2
Πst
[{
cijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t) + ρit(y
t, zt)hijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t)
}]
= Πst
[{
cit(θ
i1
0 , θ
i2
0 , y
t, zt) + ρit(y
t, zt)χit(yt, z
t))
}]
≥
∑
j
Πst
[{
ηijt (xt, yt, z
t)
}]
= Πst
[{
ηit(yt, z
t)
}]
for all st
This condition is necessary, but not sufficient: If household net wealth is non-negative in
all states of the world for both households, then regional net wealth is too, but not vice-
versa. In particular, it is the household in the x = hi state whose constraint is crucial, not
the average household’s. If we simply calibrated the model to regional income shocks, the
constraints would hardly bind.
15Proof: If a set of households with non-zero mass had a non-binding solvency constraint at some node
(xt, yt, zt), there would have to be another set of households with non-zero mass at node (xt
′
, yt
′
, zt) that
violate their solvency constraint.
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5.5 Model-generated Data Without Aggregate Uncertainty
In this section and the next, we show that a calibrated version of the model replicates the
moments of interest in the data. In a first step, we abstract from aggregate uncertainty.
We compute various stationary equilibria, each one corresponding to a different value for
the housing collateral ratio. We vary the collateral ratio my by varying the non-housing
expenditure share α.16 Since α is persistent in the data, comparing different stationary
equilibrium allocations corresponding to different housing collateral ratios is a reasonable
first step. In the next section, we compute the model with aggregate uncertainty.
5.5.1 Computation of Stationary Equilibrium
The aggregate endowment of non-housing consumption grows at a constant rate λ, as does
the housing endowment in each region, while the aggregate non-housing expenditure share
α is constant.
In a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate consumption weight ξat grows at a constant
rate g. Section A in the appendix discussed the details. We assign each household a
label cˆ, which is this household’s consumption share at the end of the last period. Let
C denote the domain of the normalized consumption weights. Consider a household of
type 1. Its new consumption weight at the start of the next period follows the cutoff rule
$1(cˆ, x, y) : C ×X × Y −→ C:
$1(cˆ, x, y) = cˆ if cˆ > $1(x, y)
= $1(x, y) elsewhere,
where $1(x, y) is the cutoff consumption share. At the cutoff, the household’s net wealth
is exactly zero: C1($1(x, y), x, y)) = 0, where C1(cˆ, x, y) is the net wealth function:
C1(cˆ, x, y) : C ×X × Y −→ R+, and it solves the following functional equation:
C1(cˆ, x, y) =
cˆ
α
− η1(x, y) + β(λ)−γgγ
∑
x′,y′
pi(x′, y′|x, y)C1(cˆ′, x′, y′), (11)
Recall that the price today of a unit of non-durable consumption to be delivered next period
is β(λ)−γgγ , where λ is the growth rate of the aggregate non-housing endowment ca. The
policy functions for a household of type 2 are defined analogously. The new consumption
shares cˆ′ follow immediately from the cutoff rule: cˆ′ = $
1(cˆ,x,y)
g . Housing consumption is
simply h′ = $
1(cˆ,x,y)
g (
1
α − 1), because the expenditure shares do not vary across regions.
Definition 4. A stationary equilibrium consists of a scalar g∗, an invariant measure
Φj(cˆ, x, y) for each type j and a policy function {$j(cˆ, x, y)}j=1,2 for the consumption
16This is equivalent to re-scaling the amount of non-durable consumption while keeping the expenditure
share constant in the case of separable utility.
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shares that implements the cutoff rule {$j(x, y)}j=1,2 such that:∑
j=1,2
∫
C×X×Y
$j(cˆ, x, y)dΦj(cˆ, x, y) = g∗.
In a stationary equilibrium, the consumption shares of all the unconstrained households
drift down at a constant rate and the joint measure Φj over consumption shares cˆ for type j
households and shocks (x, y) is constant. Lustig (2003) proves the existence of a stationary
equilibrium, based on Krueger (2000); section A in the appendix states the necessary
conditions.
We approximate the net wealth function C(·) as a function of the consumption weight
$ using Tchebychev polynomials of degree 7 with 30 grid points (see Judd (1998)). The
algorithm starts out by conjecturing an initial aggregate weight shock g0. We then solve
for the optimal cutoff rule, simulate the model and compute the new implied aggregate
weight shock g1. Iterations continue until {g} converges to g∗.
5.5.2 Calibration
Preference Parameters We consider the case of separable utility by setting γ at 2 and
² at .5, the estimate of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution by Yogo (2006). In the
benchmark calibration, the discount factor β is set equal to .95. We also explore lower
values for β.
Non-Housing Endowment The aggregate housing and non-durable consumption en-
dowment grow at a constant rate of λ = 1.83 percent. We use a 5-state first-order Markov
process to approximate the regional labor income share dynamics (see Tauchen and Hussey
(1991)): log ηˆit = .94 log ηˆ
i
t−1+ eit with the standard deviation of the shocks σe set to 1 per-
cent. The estimation details are in appendix B. We do not model permanent income
differences between regions. Finally, as is standard in this literature, we use a 2-state
Markov process to match the level of household labor income share ˆˆηjt (as a fraction of
regional labor income) dynamics. The persistence is .9 and the standard deviation is .4
(see Heaton and Lucas (1996)).
Average Housing Collateral Ratio We use two approaches to calibrate the average
US ratio of housing wealth to housing plus human wealth: a factor payments and an asset
values approach. First, we examine the factor payments. Between 1946 and 2002, the
average ratio of total US rental income to labor income (compensation of employees) plus
rental income ρhρh+y was 3.8 percent (see table 5, row 1). This measure of rental income
includes imputed rents for owner-occupied housing. Second, we look at asset values. Over
the same period, the average ratio of US residential wealth to labor income (plus transfers)
is about 1.4 (row 3). In our model, we match this number with my = .025 (see bottom
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panel of figure 4). Both approaches suggest a ratio smaller than five percent.
The above calculation ignores non-housing sources of collateral. If we include dividends
and interest payments, and we treat proprietary income as non-collateralizable, then the
factor payment ratio increases to 13.2 percent (row 2). In terms of asset values, row 4 shows
that the average ratio of the market value of US non-farm,non-financial corporations to
non-farm, non-financial labor income is 3.56 (see Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2005b) for
data construction). Thus, the total ratio of collateralizable wealth to labor income is 4.96
(row 5). In our model, we match this number with my = .07. Using a broad measure of
collateral, we end up with a ratio close to 10 percent.
[Table 5 about here.]
All regions have the same non-housing expenditure share α(zt) (see assumption 3). In
this section, α is constant. We compute stationary equilibria for 25 points on a grid for
the housing collateral ratio my = 1− α ∈ [.005, .165].
5.5.3 History of Household Shocks
The changes in the regional consumption shares cˆit(x
t, yt) = ξ
i(xt,yt)
ξat
are governed by the
growth rate of the regional weight relative to that of the aggregate weights g. This is a
measure of how constrained the households in this region are relative to the rest of the
economy. These regional consumption shares depend on the history of household-specific
shocks xt, but only in a limited sense. When one of the households switches from the low
to the high state, her weight increases, causing regional consumption to increase even when
the regional income share stays constant (ˆˆηjt increases but ηˆ
i is constant).17 However, these
household shocks are i.i.d across regions, so that their effects disappear when we integrate
over all household-specific histories:∫
xt∈Xt
cˆit(x
t, yt)dΠ(xt) =
∫
xt∈Xt
ξi(xt, yt)
ξat
dΠ(xt) ' cˆit(yt), (12)
by the LLN. Even though the collateral constraints pertain to households and households
within a region are heterogeneous, on average, the regional consumption share cˆit(y
t) be-
haves as if it is the consumption share of a representative household in the region facing a
single, but tighter, collateral constraint (see section 5.4).
To an econometrician with only regional data generated by the model, it looks as if the
stand-in agent’s consumption share is subject to preference shocks or measurement error.
These preference shocks follow from switches in the identity of the constrained household
within the region. To illustrate this point, figure 3 plots the simulated equilibrium house-
hold and regional consumption shares against income shares. The first panel shows the
17This is why it is possible that the cross-sectional dispersion of regional consumption shares may exceed
the cross-sectional dispersion of regional income shares. This occurs often in the data, see right panel of
figure 2.
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two households’ income (dashed lines) and consumption shares (full lines) in one particular
region. The second panel just adds up across the two households to show the regional in-
come (dashed line) and consumption shares (full line) for the same history of shocks xt, yt
and the same region. Finally, the third panel shows the regional consumption and income
shares for the same sequence of regional shocks yt, but integrates out the effect of xt by
averaging across 1000 regions as in equation (12). When one of the households switches to
the high household-specific state and is constrained, its consumption share increases. This
increases the regional consumption share, even though the regional income share may not
have changed. Because such household-specific shocks are i.i.d. across regions, they are
averaged out in the bottom panel. On average, regional consumption shares only respond
to regional income shares.
[Figure 3 about here.]
5.5.4 Joint Distribution of Regional Consumption, Income and Housing Col-
lateral
As we did for the data in sections 3 and 4, we now examine the properties of the cross-section
distribution of regional consumption and the income elasticity of regional consumption
growth in the model. For each of 25 values of my between .5% and 16.5%, we simulate
the model for 600 periods and 1000 regions to obtain a panel of consumption and income
shares.
The Cross-Sectional Consumption Distribution in the Model The top panel in
figure 4 plots the ratio of the cross-sectional dispersion of regional consumption shares to
income shares for the 25 equilibria. The regional consumption-to-income dispersion ratio
declines from 2, when the collateral ratio is .5%, to .5 when the collateral ratio is 16.5%.
For the 23 US MSA’s, the mean consumption-to-income dispersion ratio over the 1952-2002
sample is 1.28. The model matches this number for our benchmark collateral ratio of 5%.
When collateral is scarce, the cross-sectional standard deviation of regional consumption
exceeds the standard deviation of regional income. It looks as if there are regional gains
from risk sharing that are left unexploited, while, in fact, there are none.
Income Elasticity of Regional Consumption The second panel of figure 4 plots the
elasticity a1 of regional consumption share growth with respect to regional income share
growth against the housing collateral ratio. The slope coefficient a1 is obtained by running
the risk-sharing regression
∆ log(cˆit+1) = a
i
0 + a1∆log(ηˆ
i
t+1) + ν
i
t+1,
on model-generated data, where ai0 is a regional fixed effect.
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To understand the regression results, recall that in equilibrium, the growth rate of the
regional consumption shares is determined by the difference between the growth rates of the
regional weight and the growth rate of the aggregate weight: ∆ log(cˆit+1) = ∆ log ξ
i
t+1 − g.
As argued in the previous section, ∆ log ξit+1 only responds to regional income shocks on
average (∆ log ηˆit+1). The effect of household-specific shocks x is absorbed in the error term
νit+1. Thus, our model provides a theory of the measurement error term ν
i
t+1.
In the benchmark case of β = .95, the elasticity decreases from 0.4 to 0.1 as the
housing collateral ratio increases from .005 to .165. At our benchmark collateral value of
five percent, the slope is 0.28. These slope coefficients are similar to what we found in the
data (section 4). As we lower the discount factor, the slope coefficients increase in absolute
value. For β = .90 (not shown in the graph), the constraints are tighter on average, and
the slope coefficients vary between 0.5 and 0.1.
[Figure 4 about here.]
These slope coefficients reflect two forces. First, in case of a positive shock to house-
hold/regional income, the cutoff shares are much higher in low collateral economies (see
upper panel of figure 5). Second, in case of a negative shock, the household consumption
shares drift down at a higher rate g in the low collateral economy (see lower panel of figure
5). The same logic applies to the regional consumption shares. From equation (11) for
fixed g, an increase in α, or equivalently, a decrease in the housing collateral ratio increases
the cutoff level $1(x, y) at which the net wealth function hits zero for any state (x, y) (see
proposition 8 in the appendix ). On average, the percentage increase in the household
consumption share log$1(x, y)− log g− log cˆ, will be larger when a household switches to
a higher x or y. Likewise, the decrease in consumption share is larger after a bad shock
because log g is larger. The same logic applies to the regional consumption share, because
it is the sum of the shares for the two types of households. These effects are further pro-
nounced for lower discount rates; the open circles are for β = .90 and the plus signs are for
β = .85.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The Quantity Anomaly Regional consumption is very sensitive to regional income
shocks, in spite of the fact that most of the risk faced by households has been traded away in
equilibrium, even at low collateral ratios. This is apparent in figure 6. The upper panel plots
the standard deviation of regional consumption growth (full circles correspond to β = .95),
while the lower panel plot the standard deviation of household consumption growth. In the
data, the average standard deviation of consumption growth for US metropolitan areas is
4.15 percent. The model generates slightly too much regional risk sharing when β = .95,
but for β = .9 (β = .85), the model matches the 4.15 percent dispersion when my is 4%
(6%).
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The full lines in each panel represent the standard deviation of regional and household
income growth, respectively. As is apparent from the bottom panel of 6, more than 75%
of total household risk has been insured. Yet, in the top panel, the standard deviation of
regional income growth risk is lower than that of regional consumption growth risk for low
levels of housing collateral! What explains this quantity anomaly?
First, at the household level: The standard deviation of the household consumption
share growth rate equals the standard deviation of the growth rate of the household weight
shocks, and we find that std
(
1
γ∆log ξ
ij
t+1
)
< std(∆ log ηijt+1). Second, at the regional level:
The standard deviation of regional consumption share growth rate equals the standard
deviation of the growth rate of the regional weight shock, and we find that std
(
∆log ξit+1
)
>
std(∆ log η̂it+1). This reversal comes about because (1) the household income share shocks
∆ log ˆˆηijt+1 are perfectly negatively correlated across the households within region, while
(2) the individual household weight shocks that result from these shocks are not. At
the household level, income growth is more negatively correlated within a region than
consumption growth because of intra-regional risk-sharing -not in spite of risk sharing!
Therefore, when we aggregate from the household to the regional level, household risk
sharing gives rise to regional consumption growth volatility that exceeds regional income
growth volatility.
[Figure 6 about here.]
5.6 Model-generated Data with Aggregate Uncertainty
Rather than comparing equilibria with different collateral ratios, we now compute an equi-
librium with aggregate uncertainty, in which the housing collateral ratio varies over time.
Calibration of the expenditure ratio We modify the calibration to let the housing
collateral ratio, or equivalently the non-housing expenditure share, be a function of the
aggregate state: α(zt). In particular, we assume that the log of the aggregate non-housing
expenditure ratio ` = log
(
α
1−α
)
follows an autoregressive process:
`t = µ` + .96 log `t−1 + ²t,
with σ² = .03 and µ` was chosen to match the average US post-war non-housing expenditure
ratio of 4.41, taken from Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2004). Denote by L the domain of
`. We scale up the quantity of labor income in the model to match an average collateral
ratio of 10 percent. In other words, we stack the deck against ourselves by allowing for a
broad measure of collateral (see rows 2 or 5 of table 5). The rest of the calibration remains
the same.
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5.6.1 Computation of Markov Stationary Equilibrium
When the aggregate shocks move the non-housing expenditure share α and the collateral
ratio around, the joint measure over consumption shares and states changes over time.
Instead of keeping track the entire measure or the entire history of aggregate shocks in
the state space, we have policy functions depend on a vector with the k last aggregate
weight shocks: −→g k = [g−1, g−2, . . . , g−k] ∈ G.18 Consider a household of type 1. A house-
hold’s new consumption weight at the start of the next period follows a simple cutoff rule
$1(cˆ, x, y, `,−→g k) : C ×X × Y × L× G −→ C:
$1(cˆ, x, y, `,−→g k) = cˆ if cˆ > $1(x, y, `,−→g k)
= $1(x, y, `,−→g k) elsewhere,
where $1(x, y, `,−→g k) is the cutoff consumption share for which the collateral constraints
hold with equality. The cutoff consumption share satisfiesC1($1(x, y, `,−→g k), x, y, `,−→g k)) =
0, where C1(cˆ, x, y, `,−→g k) : C×X×Y ×L×G −→ R+ is the net wealth function. The policy
functions for a household of type 2 are defined analogously. Next period’s consumption
shares are:
cˆ′ =
$1(cˆ, x, y, `,−→g k)
g
,
where g =
∑
j=1,2
∫
C×X×Y×L×G $
j(cˆ, x, y; `,−→g k)dΦj(cˆ, x, y; `,−→g ∞) is the actual aggregate
weight shock. Let Φj(cˆ, x, y; `,−→g ∞) denote the joint measure over cˆ and (x, y) which
depends on the infinite history of shocks, and let Ξ(`,−→g ∞) denote the joint measure over
` and g.
Definition 5. An approximate kth-order Markov stationary equilibrium consists of a fore-
casting function g(`,−→g k), a measure Φj(cˆ, x, y; `,−→g ∞) for each type j and a policy function
{$j(cˆ, x, y; `,−→g k)}j=1,2 that implements the cutoff rule {$j(x, y, `,−→g k)}j=1,2, where the
forecasting function has zero average prediction errors:
g(`,−→g k) =
∑
j=1,2
∫
−→g ∞|−→g k
∫
C×X×Y×L×G
$j(cˆ, x, y; `,−→g k)dΦj(cˆ, x, y; `,−→g ∞)dΞ(`,−→g ∞)
To approximate the household’s net wealth function C(·), we use 5th-degree Tcheby-
chev polynomials in the two continuous state variables, the consumption weights $ and
the log expenditure ratio `. We compute a first-order Markov equilibrium. The prediction
errors are percentage deviations of actual from spent aggregate consumption. These ap-
proximation errors are small. Table 6 shows that they never exceed 1.9% in absolute value,
they are .3% on average and their standard deviation is about .4%. The computation is
accurate.
18The model tells us which moment of the distribution in the last period to keep track of: if many agents
were severely constrained last period and g−1 was large, very few are constrained this period and g is small.
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[Table 6 about here.]
5.6.2 The Joint Distribution of Regional Consumption, Income and Housing
Collateral
The model with aggregate shocks generates an equilibrium distribution of regional con-
sumption, income and housing collateral that closely resembles that in the data. We
simulate a panel of T = 15000 periods and N = 100 regions. On average, the ratio of
housing wealth to total wealth, my, is 10% and the average collateral scarcity is m˜y = .71.
We start by computing the regional consumption wedges.
The Distribution of Regional Consumption Wedges in Model The wedges are
defined as before, but now computed from model-generated regional consumption shares:
κit+1 =
(
cˆit
)−γ = ( ξit+1ξat+1)−γ . Figure 7 reveals a close correlation between the cross-sectional
standard deviation (left box) and the cross-sectional mean (right box) of the regional wedges
(dashed line), and the collateral scarcity measure (full line, measured against the right
axis). The mean regional consumption tax varies between five and zero percent, while the
standard deviation varies between 19 and 26 percent, and both track the collateral scarcity
measure closely. These model-generated wedges line up closely with the wedges we found
for the 23 MSA’s reported in figure 1. These changes in the moments of the wedges reflect
changes in the underlying distribution of regional consumption shares.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Underlying Changes in Consumption Distribution Figure 8 shows the cross-sectional
dispersion of consumption in the model. When housing collateral is scarce, the cross-
sectional dispersion increases (left box). The turning points in the cross-sectional disper-
sion of consumption coincide with the turning points in the housing collateral ratio. For
example, between periods 325 and 375 it increases by 40 percent, from .15 to .23 as the
collateral scarcity increases from .5 to .9. The right panel controls for changes in the
income dispersion. The ratio of consumption dispersion to income dispersion is almost
twice as high when collateral scarcity is at its highest value in the simulation. We found
the same variation in the data (see figure 2). Again, the model generates the quantity
anomaly. When collateral is scarce, the cross-sectional consumption dispersion exceeds the
cross-sectional income dispersion.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 9 confirms the positive correlation between the consumption share dispersion and
the collateral scarcity measure in a scatter plot of 15000 model-generated data points. The
thick cloud in the upper right corner shows that the same level of consumption dispersion
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corresponds to various collateral ratios.19 We find a similar pattern in the data, especially
after 1972 (right panel of figure 10).
[Figure 9 about here.]
One shortcoming is that the model produces too little dispersion in regional consump-
tion shares relative to the data. When comparing the scale on figures 9 and 10, keep in
mind that the mean consumption share in the data is 1/23, while in the model the mean
consumption share is 1. This is not surprising, because part of the higher dispersion in the
data reflects permanent differences between the metropolitan areas. Our calibration ab-
stracts from these permanent differences. The level differences disappear in growth rates.
And indeed, our model does match the average regional standard deviation of consumption
share growth over time and the ratio of consumption share to income share dispersion in
the data (see figure 6).
[Figure 10 about here.]
Income Elasticity of Consumption Share Growth Finally, we use the same simu-
lation to re-estimate the consumption share growth regressions that we ran on the regional
consumption share data in section 4. The results are reported in table 7. As in the data,
we run two different specifications of the linear consumption growth regressions. In the
first specification (panel A), we only include an interaction term between regional income
growth and the collateral ratio. The slope coefficient in the first specification varies between
.32, for β = .95, and .58, for β = .75 . Because m˜y is .71 on average in the simulation, the
average fraction of income shocks that ends up in consumption is 23% for β = .95. That
implies that 77% of income risk is insured on average. For β = .75, the average fraction
of risk that is shared among regions is 58%. The 66% estimate for the average fraction of
income risk shared in the data (see section 4, table 2, panel B) corresponds to a value for β
between .95 and .90. More importantly, the slope coefficients imply a lot of time-variation
in the degree of risk sharing. In the model, the 5th and 95th percentile of m˜y are .55 and
.95. That distribution implies a 90% confidence interval for the degree of risk-sharing of
[69.3, 82.2] percent for β = .95 and [44.5, 67.9] percent for β = .75.
The second specification allows for a separate income growth term. Panel B reveals
that the slope coefficient varies in the sample between -.04 when my = mymax and .34
when my = mymin, in the case of β = .95. In the case of β = .75, the coefficient varies
between .09 and .54. In the data, the slope coefficients varied between .28 and .45 (see
section 4, table 2, panel B). Also, the regression R2 are very close to those in the data,
around 7%. They are low simply because regional risk is small compared to household risk.
[Table 7 about here.]
19This reflects the dependence of equilibrium allocations on the history of aggregate shocks, in addition
to their dependence on the collateral ratio.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Two aspects of financial markets are often studied separately. One is their role in allocat-
ing consumption risk, the other is asset returns. A model with limited commitment and
default resulting in the loss of housing collateral is successful in explaining both features.
In Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2004), we focus on the asset pricing implications20, and
in a related paper (Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2005a)), we test the model’s asset pricing
predictions on US stock returns. We find that US investors demand higher risk premia
on stocks whose returns are more correlated with aggregate consumption growth when the
housing collateral ratio is low. The focus of this paper was on the risk-sharing dynamics
of the model. We presented evidence from a new data set of US metropolitan areas con-
sumption that supports the collateral mechanism: the conditional correlation of regional
consumption growth with income growth increases substantially when collateral is scarce.
More recent work by Campbell and Cocco (2004) shows direct evidence from UK data that
housing prices are an important factor in consumption decisions at the household level.
Iacoviello (2004) considers the implications of housing collateral constraints for aggregate
consumption.
Household level frictions, such as the collateral constraints we study, may help us
understand aggregate consumption dynamics across different regions and countries. Most
existing work in this literature focusses on frictions at the aggregate level, such as sovereign
debt constraints. These models have a hard time explaining imperfect risk-sharing at
different levels of aggregation. The aggregation arguments we develop here open up new
avenues to explain macro risk-sharing patterns by modeling micro-frictions. Hortacsu,
Lustig and Moskowitz (2005) provide more evidence by explicitly tracing some variation
in US regional risk sharing back to financial market participation differences.
Finally, the collateral mechanism explored here may also help explain low-frequency
household risk-sharing patterns. In recent work, Krueger and Perri (2003) document that
the dramatic increase in labor income inequality in the US between 1970 and 2002 was not
accompanied by a similar increase in household consumption inequality.21 Our housing
collateral effect seems consistent with these trends in household consumption and income
inequality as well. As shown in figure 11, in the US, the ratio of residential wealth to labor
income increased from 1.4 to 1.9 and the ratio of mortgages to income increased from .45
to .8. This indicates an increase of between 30 and 45 percent in the US collateral ratio
over this period! A persistent increase in housing collateral of that magnitude would give a
substantial boost to risk sharing and a reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion of income
20We solve a calibrated version of this model and find that the collateral mechanism is important to
quantitatively match unconditional and conditional asset pricing moments, as well as to generate enough
variation in returns across assets.
21They explain this fact in the limited commitment model of Kehoe and Levine (1993); in this model, the
increase in income risk worsens the household’s outside option and this renders the risk sharing technology
more effective, because the constraints bind less often. In our model constraints bind less often when the
value of housing collateral increases.
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relative to consumption.
[Figure 11 about here.]
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A Technical Appendix
This appendix spells out the household problem in an economy where all trade takes place at time
zero. Most of the following results are based on Lustig (2003) and Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh
(2004).
Household Problem A household of type (θij0 , s0) purchases a complete contingent consump-
tion plan
{
cij0 (θ
ij
0 , s0), h
ij(θi0, s0)
}
at time-zero market state prices
{
p, pρi
}
. The household solves:
sup
{cij ,hij}
U(cij(θij0 , s0), h
ij(θij0 , s0))
subject to the time-zero budget constraint
Πs0
[{
cij0 (θ
ij
0 , s0) + ρ
i(s0)hij(θ
ij
0 , s0)
}]
6 θij0 +Πs0
[{
ηij0
}]
,
and an infinite sequence of collateral constraints for each t and st
Πst
[{
cijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t) + ρi(st)hijt (θ
ij
0 , s
t)
}]
≥ Πst
[{
ηijt (s
t)
}]
,∀st.
Dual Problem Given Arrow-Debreu prices
{
p, pρi
}
the household with label (θij0 , s0) minimizes
the cost C(·) of delivering initial utility wij0 to itself:
C(wij0 , s0) = min{c,h}
(
cij0 (w
ij
0 , s0) + h
ij
0 (w
ij
0 , s0)ρ
i
0(s0)
)
+
∑
st
p(st|s0)
(
cijt (w
ij
0 , s
t|s0) + hijt (wij0 , st|s0)ρit(st|s0)
)
subject to the promise-keeping constraint
U0({cij}, {hij};wij0 , si0) ≥ wij0
and the collateral constraints
Πst
[{
cijt (w
ij
0 , s
t) + ρit(s
t)hijt (w
ij
0 , s
t)
}]
≥ Πst
[{
ηijt (s
t)
}]
, ∀st.
The initial promised value wij0 is determined such that the household spends its entire initial
wealth:
C(wij0 , s0) = θ
ij
0 +Πs0
[{ηij(st)}] .
There is a monotone relationship between θij0 and w
ij
0 . The above problem is a standard, convex
programming problem. We set up the saddle point problem and then make it recursive by defining
cumulative multipliers (Marcet and Marimon (1999)). Let νij be the Lagrange multiplier on the
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promise keeping constraint and γijt (w
ij
0 , s
t) be the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint in
history st. Define a cumulative multiplier at each node: ζijt (w0, st) = 1−
∑
st γ
ij
t (w
ij
0 , s
t). Finally,
we rescale the market state price
pˆt(st) = pt(zt)/βtpit(st|s0).
By using Abel’s partial summation formula and the law of iterated expectations to the Lagrangian,
we obtain an objective function that is a function of the cumulative multiplier process ζi:
D(c, h, ζij ;wij0 , s0) =
∑
t≥0
∑
st
{
βtpi(st|s0)
[
ζijt (w
ij
0 , s
t|s0)pˆt(st)
(
cijt (w
ij
0 , s
t) + ρit(s
t)ht(w
ij
0 , s
t)
)
+γijt (w
ij
0 , s
t)Πst
[{
ηi
}] ]}
such that
ζijt (w
ij
0 , s
t) = ζijt−1(w
ij
0 , s
t−1)− γijt (wij0 , st), ζij0 (wij0 , s0) = 1
Then the recursive dual saddle point problem is given by:
inf
{cij ,hij}
sup
{ζij}
D(cij , hij , ζij ;wij0 , s0)
such that ∑
t≥0
∑
st
βtpi(st|s0)u(cijt (wij0 , st), hijt (wij0 , st)) ≥ wij0
To keep the mechanics of the model in line with standard practice, we re-scale the multipliers. Let
ξijt (ν, s
t) =
νij
ζijt (w
ij
0 , s
t)
,
The cumulative multiplier ξij(ν, st) is a non-decreasing stochastic sequence, which is initialized at
νij at time zero. We can use νij as the household label. If the constraint for household (νij , s0)
binds, it goes up, else it stays put. This follows immediately from the complementary slackness
condition for the solvency constraint.
Optimal Non-Housing Consumption The f.o.c. for c(νij , st) is :
pˆt(st) = ξ
ij
t (ν
ij , st)uc(c
ij
t (ν
ij , st), hijt (ν
ij , st)).
Upon division of the first order conditions for any two households ij and kl, the following restriction
on the joint evolution of marginal utilities over time and across states must hold:
uc(c
ij
t (νij , st), h
ij
t (νij , st))
uc(cklt (νkl, st), hklt (νkl, st))
=
ξklt (ν
kl, st)
ξijt (νij , st)
. (13)
Growth rates of marginal utility of non-durable consumption, weighted by the multipliers, are
equalized across agents:
ξit+1(ν
ij , st+1)
ξit(νij , st)
uc(c
ij
t+1(ν
ij , st+1), hijt+1(ν
ij , st+1))
uc(c
ij
t (νij , st), h
ij
t (νij , st))
=
pˆt+1(st+1)
pˆt(st)
=
ξklt+1(ν
kl, st+1)
ξklt (νkl, st)
uc(cklt+1(ν
kl, st+1), hklt+1(ν
kl, st+1))
uc(cklt (νkl, st), hklt (νkl, st))
.
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In the case of separable preferences between non-housing and housing consumption, there is a
simple mapping from the multipliers ξ at st to the equilibrium allocations of both commodities.
We refer to this mapping as the risk-sharing rule:
cijt (ν
ij , st) =
ξijt (νij , st)
1
γ
ξat (zt)
cat (z
t) (14)
where
ξat (z
t) =
∑
j=1,2
∑
xt,yt
∫ (
ξijt (ν
ij , st)
) 1
γ pi(xt, yt, zt|x0, y0, z0)
pi(zt|z0) dΦ
j
0,
where Φj0 is the cross-sectional joint distribution over initial consumption weights and initial en-
dowments for a household of type j. By the law of large numbers, the aggregate weight process
only depends on the aggregate history zt. It is easy to verify that this rule satisfies the optimality
condition and the market clearing conditions.
The time zero ratio of marginal utilities is pinned down by the ratio of multipliers on the
promise-keeping constraints. For t > 0, it tracks the stochastic weights ξ. From the first order
condition w.r.t. ξijt (νij , st) and the complementary slackness conditions, we obtain a reservation
weight policy:
ξijt = ξ
ij
t−1 if ξ
ij
t−1 > ξt(xt, yt, z
t), (15)
ξijt = ξt(xt, yt, z
t) otherwise. (16)
where the cutoff ξ
t
is defined such that the collateral constraints hold with equality:
Πst
[{
cijt (ν
ij , st; ξ
t
(νij , st)) + ρi(st)hi(νij , st; ξ
t
(νij , st))
}]
= Πst
[{
ηijt (s
t)
}]
.
The history-independence of the cutoff is established in proposition 6.
Optimal Housing Consumption The risk-sharing rule for housing services also follows a
cutoff rule:
hijt (s
t) =
(
ξijt (st)
) 1
γ
ξit(xt, yt, zt)
χit(y
t, zt), (17)
where the denominator is now the regional weight shock, defined as
ξit(x
t, yt, zt) =
∑
j=1,2
(
ξijt (s
t)
) 1
γ
.
To minimize notation, we dropped the ν in the ξ functions. Given this risk sharing rule and the
form of the utility function, the regional rental price for any region i is given by:
ρit = ψ
(
hijt
cijt
)−1
ε
= ψ
(
ξat
ξit
χit
cat
)−1
ε
We now verify that this risk-sharing rule clears the housing market in each region and satisfies the
first order condition for housing services consumption.
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Proof. First, note that these risk sharing rules clear the housing market in each region because(
ξi1t (s
t)
) 1
γ +
(
ξi2t (s
t)
) 1
γ = ξit by definition. Second, let’s check whether it satisfies the first order
condition for non-durable and durable consumption:
ξijt uc(c
ij
t (s
t), hijt (s
t)) = pˆt(st|s0)
ξijt uh(c
ij
t (s
t), hijt (s
t)) = ρit(y
t, zt)pˆt(st|s0)
Recall that the marginal utility of non-housing consumption and housing consumption are:
uc(c
ij
t (s
t), hijt (s
t)) = (cijt )
−1
ε
[
(cijt )
ε−1
ε + ψ(hijt )
ε−1
ε
] 1−εγ
ε−1
uh(c
ij
t (s
t), hijt (s
t)) = ψ(hijt )
−1
ε
[
(cijt )
ε−1
ε + ψ(hijt )
ε−1
ε
] 1−εγ
ε−1
In the case of separability, ε = 1γ , and the marginal utility of housing services becomes: uh(c
ij
t (st), h
ij
t (st)) =
ψ(hijt )
−1
ε . Substituting this into the optimality condition for housing produces the following ex-
pression:
ξijt ψ(h
ij
t )
−1
ε = ξijt ψ
[
(ξi,jt )
1
γ
ξit
χi,t
]−1
ε
= ψ
[
χi,t
ξit
]−1/ε
= ρit(y
t, zt)pˆt(st|s0)
where the second equality follows from inserting the risk sharing rule for housing services, and
the last equality follows from separability, γ = 1ε . Likewise, inserting the risk sharing rule for
non-durable consumption into the optimality condition gives:
ξijt ψ
[
(ξi,jt )
1
γ
ξat
cat
]−1
ε
=
[
cat
ξat
]−1
ε
= pˆt(st|s0)
Dividing through by the last line of the preceding equation, we obtain the following result: ρit =
ψ
(
ξat
ξit
χit
cat
)−1
ε
for any household j in region i. This is exactly the rental price we conjectured at the
start, together with the risk sharing rule, which confirms that the risk sharing rule satisfies the first
order condition for optimality. The risk sharing rule also clears the housing market in every region
and it clears the market for non-durable consumption.
Non-separability With non-separable preferences between non-housing and housing consump-
tion (γε 6= 1), a similar risk sharing rule holds (derivation available on authors’ web sites).
The Non-Housing Expenditure Share The non-housing expenditure share is the same
for all households j in region i:
cijt
cijt + ρith
ij
t
≡ αijt ≡ αit.
Proof. To show this, we use the equilibrium risk-sharing rule for non-housing and housing con-
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sumption, as well as the expression for ρit to obtain:
αijt =
ξijt (ν
ij ,st)
1
γ
ξat (z
t) c
a
t (z
t)
ξijt (ν
ij ,st)
1
γ
ξat (z
t) c
a
t (zt) + ψ
[
ξat
ξit(y
t,zt)
χit(yt,z
t)
cat (z
t)
]−1
ε (ξijt (st))
1
γ
ξit(y
t,zt)
χit(yt, zt)
=
1
1 + ψ
[
ξat
ξit(y
t,zt)
χit(yt,z
t)
cat (z
t)
] ε−1
ε
Note that this expression is the same for all households j in region i.
Assumption 3 imposes that the regional shares αi only depend on the aggregate history zt:
αit = αt(z
t). Hence, we assume that the ratio ξ
i
t
ξat
cat = χ
i
t for all regions, and all aggregate histories.
Note that all regions have the same rental price as well, as a result of this assumption.
History Independence of the Cutoff Rule
Proposition 6. In a state with a binding collateral constraint, the equilibrium consumption share,
cˆijt =
cijt
cat
, only depends on (xt, yt) and zt.
Proof. When the collateral constraint binds for household ij,
Πst
[{
cijt (w
ij
0 , s
t)
[
1 +
ρit(st)h
ij
t (w
ij
0 , s
t)
cijt (w
ij
0 , s
t)
]}]
= Πst
[{
ηijt (xt, yt, z
t)
}]
,
Πst
[{
cˆijt c
a
t (z
t)
1
αt(zt)
}]
= Πst
[{
ˆˆηijt (xt)ηˆ
i(yt, zt)ηat (z
t)
}]
,
where the second line follows from the definition of the non-housing expenditure share, and we use
assumption 3.
Obviously, the right hand side does not depend on (xt−1, yt−1), only on (xt, yt). Fix an ar-
bitrary aggregate history zt. We can take two households with histories (xt−1′, xt, yt−1′, yt) and
(xt−1′′, xt, yt−1′′, yt). The right hand side is the same for both, because the labor endowment share
process is first order Markov in (x, y, z) (see assumption 1), and the pricing functional only depends
on zt. So, the left hand side has to be the same for both regions as well. Since the non-housing
expenditure share only depends on the aggregate history zt, this immediately implies that the
household’s consumption share cˆijt can only depend on (xt, yt, zt) when the collateral constraint
binds.
Stationary Equilibrium S = (X × Y ) and S is the associated σ-algebra. B(C) is the Borel
set of C.
Theorem 7. Let (S,S) and (C,B(C)) be measurable spaces. The policy function $j(cˆ, x, y) :
C × Y ×X −→ C implies a Markov transition function:
P [((cˆ, x, y), A×B] = pi(B|x, y) if $j(cˆ, x, y) ∈ A
= 0 if $j(cˆ, x, y) /∈ A
for all (cˆ) ∈ C, (x, y) ∈ S,A ∈ B(C), B ∈ S.
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defines a transition function on (S,B(C)).
(see Stokey, Lucas and Precott (1989) p. 284, Theorem 9.13). Now, the invariant measure
Φj , j = 1, 2 satisfies:∫
C×X×Y
P [((cˆ, x, y), A×B]dΦj(cˆ, x, y) = Φj(A×B).
A ∈ B(C), B ∈ S.
The transition function P satisfies the mixing condition, necessary for the existence of a unique,
stationary measure, (Condition M in Stokey et al. (1989), p. 348) if the transition probability
matrix pi(x′, y′|x, y) has only non-zero elements and if perfect risk sharing cannot be sustained,
g > 1, because in that case there is zero mass of consumption shares above the highest cutoff level
maxx,y$j(x, y), and it is easy to verify that this cutoff level can be attained from anywhere in
the state space in a finite number of steps. If the mixing condition is satisfied, this establishes the
existence of a unique, stationary equilibrium. Lustig (2003) provides a detailed proof in a similar
environment.
Proposition 8. Fix a g ≥ 1 and g ≤ ηmaxηmin . Consider two non-housing expenditure shares α′′ > α′.
Then $1,′′(x, y) < $1,′(x, y) for all (x, y).
Proof. We know that the net wealth function solves the following functional equation:
C1(cˆ, x, y) =
cˆ
α
− η1(x, y) + βgγ(λ)−γ
∑
x′,y′
pi(x′, y′|x, y)C1(cˆ′, x′, y′),
and the cutoff consumption share satisfies C1($1(x, y), x, y)) = 0. Since α′′ > α′, it has to be the
case that C1,′′(cˆ, x, y) < C1,′(cˆ, x, y) for any cˆ, x, y, which implies that the cutoff consumption share
satisfies $1,′′(x, y), x, y) > $1,′(x, y), x, y).
B Calibration of Regional Labor Income Shocks
We use the regional data set described in appendix (C) to calibrate the persistence of the regional
income share process, used in section 5.5. We estimate an AR(1) process for the log regional income
share. We estimate an AR(1) process for 1952-2002 and use the log disposable income share:
log ηˆit+1 = .9434 log ηˆ
i
t + ν
i
t+1
(0.0092) (0.0286)
If we introduce fixed effects, to correct for permanent income differences, the slope coefficient drops
to .85. Based on these estimates, we set the AR(1) coefficient equal to 0.94 and the standard
deviation of the innovation equal to 0.01. We use the Tauchen and Hussey (1991) method to
discretize the AR(1) process into a 5-state Markov chain. The grid points are
[−0.0879, −0.0440, 0, 0.0440, 0.0879]
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and the transition matrix is:
0.9526 0.0474 0.0000 0 0
0.0069 0.9666 0.0265 0.0000 0
0.0000 0.0140 0.9721 0.0140 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0265 0.9666 0.0069
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0474 0.9526

Likewise, we calibrate the income share process within a region, ˆˆη, as a two state Markov chain.
The states are [.6, 1.4] and the transition matrix is [.9, .1 ; .1, .9].
C Data Appendix
This appendix describes the metropolitan data set in detail. First we define aggregate collateral
measures (section C.1). Then, we define metropolitan areas and describe the sample (section C.2).
Lastly, in section C.3, we describe consumption and income data and compare them to national
aggregates.
C.1 Aggregate Collateral Measures
Residential Wealth 1890-1970: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to
1970, series N197, ”Non-farm Residential Wealth”. Original source: Grebler, Blanck and Winnick,
The Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects, Princeton University
press, 1956 (Tables 15 and A1). Excluded are clubs, motels, dormitories, hotels and the like. The
series measures the current value of structures and land. Structures are reported in current dollars
by transforming the value in constant dollars by the construction cost index (series N121 and 139).
Structures in constant dollars are obtained from an initial value of residential wealth in 1890 (based
on 1890 Census report ‘Real Estate Mortgages’) and estimates of net capital formation in constant
dollars. Land values are based on an estimation of the share of land value to total value using federal
Housing Administration data. These estimates are in Winnick, Wealth Estimates for Residential
Real Estate, 1890-1950, doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1953.
1945-2001: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Board, Balance sheet of households and non-profit
organizations (B.100, row 4). Line 4: Market value of (owner-occupied) household real estate (code
FL155035015). The market value of real estate wealth includes land and structures, inclusive vacant
land, vacant homes for sale, second homes and mobile homes.
Fixed Assets 1925-2001: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Asset Tables, Current cost of
net stock of owner-occupied and tenant-occupied residential fixed assets for non-farm persons. This
includes 1-4 units and 5+ units and is the sum of new units, additions and alterations, major
replacements and mobile homes.
C.2 Metropolitan Areas
Definition The concept of a metropolitan areas is that of a core area containing a large pop-
ulation nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and so-
cial integration with that core. They include metropolitan statistical areas (MSA’s), consolidated
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metropolitan statistical areas (CMSA’s), and primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSA’s). An
area that qualifies as an MSA and has a population of one million or more may be recognized as a
CMSA if separate component areas that demonstrate strong internal, social, and economic ties can
be identified within the entire area and local opinion supports the component areas. Component
areas, if recognized, are designated PMSA’s. If no PMSA’s are designated within the area, then
the area remains an MSA.
The S&MM survey uses the definitions of MSA throughout the survey and of CMSA when
CMSA’s are created. We use the 30 metropolitan areas described in table 8. Before the creation
of the CMSA’s, we keep track of all separate MSA’s that later form the CMSA in order to obtain
a consistent time series. For example, the Dallas-Forth Worth CMSA consists of the population-
weighted sum of the separate Dallas MSA and Forth Worth MSA until 1973 and of the combined
area thereafter.
Households The total number of households in the 30 metropolitan areas is 47 percent of the
US total in 2000 compared to 40 percent in 1951. The total number of households are from the
Bureau of the Census. Most of the increase occurs before 1965. Likewise, the 30 metropolitan areas
we consider contain exactly 47 percent of the population in 1999 (see tables 8 and 9, first column).
[Table 8 about here.]
C.3 Metropolitan Consumption and Income Data
Price Indices Data are for urban consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Con-
sumer Price all items Index pi,at , its rent component p
i,h
t and the food component p
i,c
t are available
at the metropolitan level (Bureau of Labor Statistics). The price of rent is a proxy for the price
of shelter and the price of food is a proxy for the price of non-durables. We use the rent and
food components because the shelter and non-durables components are only available from 1967
onwards. Two-thirds of consumer expenditures on shelter consists of owner-occupied housing. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics uses a rental equivalence approach to impute the price of owner-occupied
housing. Because ρit is a relative rental price, our theory is conceptually consistent with the Bureau
of Labor Statistics approach. All indices are normalized to 100 for the period 1982-84.
Consumption and Income Inter-regional risk-sharing studies use retail sales data as a proxy
for non-durable consumption (DelNegro (1998) and references therein). Such data for metropolitan
areas have not been used before. We collect retail sales data from the annual Survey of Buying
Power published by Sales & Marketing Management (S&MM). Nominal non-durable consumption
for region i, Cit , is total retail sales minus hardware and furniture sales and vehicle sales. From
the same source we obtain the number of households in each region, N it . Real per household
consumption ci is nominal non-durable consumption deflated by pi,ct and divided by the number of
households N it .
Disposable personal income Y it is also from S&MM. Disposable personal income consists of
labor income, financial market income and net transfers. The latter two contain a potentially
important insurance component. Therefore we also use labor income plus net transfers from the
Regional Economic Information System (REIS). The latter are only available for 1970-2000. Real
per household disposable income ηi is nominal disposable income deflated by pi,at and divided by
the number of households N it .
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Appendix C compares non-durable retail sales and disposable income data with aggregate con-
sumption and income data, with metropolitan non-durable consumption data from the Consump-
tion Expenditure Survey (1986-2000 from Bureau of Labor Statistics), and with metropolitan labor
income data plus transfers (1969-2000 from REIS). The correlation between the growth rates of
aggregate real non-durable consumption per household and the metropolitan average of real non-
durable retail sales per household is 0.77. Also, our metropolitan data are highly correlated with
the metropolitan data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the REIS.
There are no complete consumer price index data for Baltimore, Buffalo, Phoenix, Tampa and
Washington. There are no complete consumption and income data for Anchorage. Elimination of
these regions leaves us with annual data for 23 metropolitan regions from 1951 until 2002. This is
the regional data set we use in the empirical work.
Comparison We compares non-durable retail sales and disposable income with aggregate con-
sumption and income data (Table 9), with metropolitan non-durable consumption data from the
Consumption Expenditure Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1986-2000, Table 10) and with
metropolitan labor income data plus transfers from the REIS for 1969-2000 (Table 11). The corre-
lation between the growth rates of aggregate real non-durable consumption per household and the
metropolitan average of real non-durable retail sales per household is 0.77. Also, our metropolitan
data are highly correlated with the metropolitan data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
REIS.
Source and Definitions We collect data from the Survey of Buying Power (and Media Mar-
kets), a special September issue of the magazine Sales and Marketing Management. The data are
proprietary and we thank S&MM for permission to use them. We use five series and reproduce the
S&MM definitions below.
Total retail sales measures sales from five major store groups considered to be the primary
channels of distribution for consumer goods in local markets. Store group sales represent the
cumulative sales of all products and or services handled by a particular store type, not just the
product lines associated with the name of the store group. The five store groups are: food stores,
automotive dealers, eating and drinking places, furniture, home furnishings and appliance stores,
and general merchandize stores. Total retail sales reflect net sales. Receipts from repairs and other
services by retailers are also included, but retail sales by wholesalers and service establishments are
not.
Automotive dealer sales are sales by retail establishments primarily engaged in selling new and
used vehicles for personal use and in parts and accessories for these vehicles. This includes boat
and aircraft dealers and excludes gasoline service stations.
Furniture, home furnishings and appliance store sales measures sales by retail stores selling
goods used for the home, other than antiques. It includes dealers in electronics (radios, TV’s,
computers and software), musical instruments and sheet music, and recordings.
Households measures the number of households, defined by the Census which includes all persons
occupying a housing unit. A single person living alone in a housing unit is also considered to be a
household. The members of a household need not be related.
Effective Buying Income is an income measure of income developed by S&MM. It is equiva-
lent to disposable personal income, as produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the NIPA
tables. It is defined as the sum of labor market income, financial income and net transfers minus
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taxes. Labor income is wages and salaries, other labor income (such as employer contributions to
private pension funds), and proprietor’s income (net farm and non-farm self-employment income).
Financial income is interests (from all sources), dividends (paid by corporations), rental income (in-
cluding imputed rental income of owner-occupants of non-farm dwellings) and royalty income. Net
transfers is Social Security and railroad retirement, other retirement and disability income, pub-
lic assistance income, unemployment compensation, Veterans Administration payments, alimony
payments, alimony and child support, military family allotments, net winnings from gambling, and
other periodic income minus social security contributions. Taxes is personal tax (federal, state and
local), non-tax payments (fines, fees, penalties, ...) and taxes on owner-occupied nonbusiness real
estate. Not included is money received from the sale of property, the value of income in kind (food
stamps, public housing subsidy, medical care, employer contributions for persons), withdrawal of
bank deposits, money borrowed, tax refunds, exchange of money between family members living
in the same household, gifts and inheritances, insurance payments and other types of lump-sum
receipts. Income is benchmarked to the decennial Census data.
We create a durable retail sales series by adding automotive dealer sales and furniture, home
furnishings and appliance store sales. Non-durable retail sales is total retail sales minus durable
retail sales.
Comparison with Aggregate Data We construct aggregate non-durable retail sales per
households and compare it to aggregate non-durable consumption per household. The aggregate
consumption data are from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The two nominal
time series are very similar. Non-durable metropolitan retail sales per household are on average 17
percent higher than national non-durable consumption per household. Their correlation between
their growth rates is 0.75. The one exception is 1999 when retail sales grow at a rate of 19.6 percent
compared to 5.6 percent for non-durable consumption. We believe this is an anomaly in the data
and deflate the 1999 retail sales so that the metropolitan average growth rate equals the national
one. This correction is identical across areas. The volatility of NIPA consumption growth is 2.57
percent whereas the volatility of aggregated S&MM non-durable retail sales is 2.89 percent. For
comparison, the volatility of non-durable retail sales growth at the regional level varies between 3.8
percent (Washington-Baltimore CMSA) and 8.3 percent (Dallas-Forth Worth CMSA).
We compare the sum of motor vehicles and parts and furniture and household equipment for
the US. to the metropolitan data on automotive dealer sales and furniture, home furnishings and
appliance store sales. Nationwide, these two categories of consumption make up 84 percent of all
durable purchases. Sales are higher by an average of 30 percent. The pattern of the two series
mimic each other closely. The correlation between national durable consumption growth and the
average metropolitan durable retail sale growth is 0.80. For 1999 the sales data show a much bigger
increase than the durable consumption data (27 percent versus 8.6 percent). As for non-durables,
we correct the 1999 metropolitan retail sales for this discrepancy. We refer to the two series as
metropolitan non-durable and durable consumption per household.
Effective buying income (EBI) per household corresponds to the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s
disposable income (personal income minus personal tax and non-tax payments). The S&MM income
data are tracking disposable income closely. There are a two discrete jumps in the EBI time-series
(1988 and 1995), but the concept remains disposable, personal income. The S&MM is not precise
as to which income categories were excluded between 1987 and 1988 and between 1994 and 1995.
From comparing the definition of EBI before and after the changes, it seems to us that the most
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important changes are the exclusion of other labor income (such as employer contributions to
pension plans, ...) and income in kind (such as food stamps, housing subsidies, medial care,...). To
obtain a consistent time-series, we correct the S&MM income data by the ratio of average EBI to
disposable income from the NIPA. This correction is identical across areas. We refer to this series
as metropolitan disposable income per household. Table 9 summarizes.
[Table 9 about here.]
Comparison with CEX Data We compare the SM&M data to the non-durable and durable
consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Based on household data, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics) provides metropolitan averages for 13
overlapping two-year periods (1986-87 until 1994-95 and 1996-97 until 1999-2000). The two data
sources have 25 regions with full data in common. Buffalo is in the CEX sample until 1994-95 and
is replaced by Tampa, Denver and Phoenix from 1996-97 onwards.
Consumption expenditures on non-durables are defined as in Attanasio and Weber (1995): It
includes food at home, food away from home, alcohol, tobacco, utilities, fuels and public services
(natural gas, heating fuel electricity, water, telephone and other personal services), transportation
(gasoline and motor oil, public transportation), apparel and services (clothes, shoes, other apparel
products and services), entertainment, personal care products and services, reading, and miscel-
laneous items. Durable consumption includes vehicle purchases and household furnishings and
equipment. Consumption expenditures on housing services measure the cost of shelter. piht h
i
t is
comprised of owned dwellings, rented dwellings and other lodging. The CEX imputes the cost for
owner-occupied dwellings by adding up mortgage interest rates, property taxes and maintenance,
improvements, repairs, property insurance and other expenditures. The average expenditure share
on housing was 31.5 percent in 2000.
Non-durable and housing services consumption add up to 55-60 percent of total annual con-
sumption expenditures. Excluded consumption items are consumer durables (furniture, household
supplies), vehicle purchases, insurance (vehicle, life, social security), health care and education.
For each area, we construct bi-annual averages from the S&MM consumption data. The corre-
lation between all data cells is 0.77 for non-durables and 0.66 for durables. The average correlation
across regions is 0.88 for non-durables and 0.73 for durables. We conclude that the metropolitan
sales data give an accurate measure of consumption on non-durables and durables at the metropol-
itan level.
We also compare the bi-annual averages of before-tax income from the CEX with the metropol-
itan disposable income. The correlation is high for each region. The average correlation across
regions is 0.94 and is 0.91 for all data cells jointly. Table 10 summarizes the correlations by region
for the 25 areas with all 13 periods.
[Table 10 about here.]
Comparison with REIS Data Disposable income contains two important channels of in-
surance. It includes income from financial markets and the net income from government transfers
and taxes. For consumption to fully capture income smoothing, the income concept should exclude
smoothing that takes place through financial markets, credit markets and through the federal tax
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and transfer system. The Regional Economic Information System (REIS) of the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis allows us to construct separate series for labor market income, financial market
income and net transfers for each metropolitan area.
For the overlapping period 1969-2000, we compute the correlation between the idiosyncratic
component of log disposable income, log
(
yˆi,dt
)
, from the S&MM and labor income plus transfers
log
(
yˆi,ltt
)
from the REIS. Table 11 shows that the correlation is generally high, but with a few
exceptions (Miami, Cincinnati, Milwaukee). The average correlation is 0.64. This imperfect cor-
relation is due to a combination of measurement error in income and insurance through financial
markets. The discrepancy warrants use of both income measures in the empirical analysis.
[Table 11 about here.]
C.4 Regional Housing Collateral
Following Case, Quigley and Shiller (2001), we construct the market value of the housing stock in
region i as the product of four components:
HV it = N
i
t HO
i
t HP
i
t V
i
0
V i0 is the median house price for detached single family housing from the US Bureau of the Census
for 2000. For the CMSA’s, it is constructed as a population weighted average of the median home
value for the constituent MSA’s. Population data are from the REIS.
Home Ownership Home ownership rates HOit are from the US Bureau of the Census. We
combine home ownership rates for 1980, 1990 and 2000 from the Decennial Census with annual
home ownership data for the largest 75 cities for 1986-2001, also from the Bureau of the Census.
We project a home ownership rate for 1986 using the 1980 and 1990 number and the annual changes
in the national home ownership rate. We use the changes in the major cities to infer MSA-level
changes between 1986 and 1990. Between 1981 and 1986 and 1975 and 1979 we apply national
changes to the MSA’s. This procedure captures most of the regional and time series behavior of
home-ownership rates. Table 12 illustrates the large regional differences in the median home value
and home ownership rate in 1980 and 2000.
House Price Index HP it is the housing price index from the Office of Federal Housing Enter-
prize Oversight, based on the weighted repeat sales method of Case and Shiller (1987). It measures
house price increases in detached single family homes between successive sales or mortgage refi-
nancing of the identical housing unit. The index is available for 1975-2000 for all MSA’s in our
sample. We construct an index for the CMSA’s as a population weighted average of the MSA’s.
The OFHEO database contains 17 million transactions over the last 27 years. There is a literature
on quality-controlled house price indices. They broadly fall into two categories. Hedonic methods
capture the contribution of narrowly defined dwelling unit and location characteristics to the price
of a house in a certain region (number of bedrooms, garage, neighborhood safety, school district,
etc.). Out of sample, houses are priced as a bundle of such characteristics. Repeat sales indices are
based on houses that have been sold or appraised twice. Because they pertain to the same prop-
erty, they control for a number of hedonic characteristics (bedrooms, neighborhood safety, etc.).
See Pollakowski (1995) for a literature review and a description of data availability.
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Regional Housing Collateral Ratio The regional collateral ratio myi is measured in the
same way as the aggregate collateral ratio my. We regress the difference between the log real per
capita housing value log hvi = log
(
HV i
pa,i
)
and the log real per capita labor income on a constant
and a time trend. The housing collateral ratio is the residual from that regression. The resulting
measure is available for 1975-2000.
[Table 12 about here.]
C.5 Canadian Data
All data for Canada are from Statistics Canada (CANSIM), obtained from the Provincial Economic
Accounts. They span the period 1981-2003, and the cross-section contains 10 provinces: Alberta,
British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario,
Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island. We also use aggregate data for Canada. Con-
sumption at the aggregate and regional level is measured as personal expenditures on non-durables
and services less personal expenditures on durable goods. income is defined as personal disposable
income. For each region, there is also a consumer price index and a population series available.
The corresponding tables are 384-002 and 384-002.
The housing wealth data measure the stock of fixed residential capital for single and multiple
dwellings. The series measures the end-of-year net stock at current prices, and are available from
1941 onwards. This value represents the cost of replacing the depreciated residential stock and is
constructed using the perpetual inventory method. These series are available for Canada, as well
as the ten provinces. The table is 030-0002.
As for the U.S. data, we calculate regional consumption shares are the ratio of real per capita
regional consumption to real per capita aggregate consumption. We do the same for the income
measure. We compute growth rates of the shares as log changes. The regional and aggregate
housing collateral ratios my are computed as the residual from a regression of the log housing
wealth-to-income ratio on a constant and a trend. The collateral scarcity measure is computed as
m˜y = my
max−myt
mymax−mymin , where my
max and mymin are the sample maximum and minimum. In our
sample, the maximum value for my is reached in 2003 (0.0495), and the minimum in 1985 (-.1102).
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Figure 1: Housing Collateral Scarcity and Moments of Wedges in Data.
The upper panel plots the cross-sectional standard deviation and mean of the raw wedges; the lower panel plots
the cross-sectional standard deviation and the mean of the wedges divided by the same moments of the autarchic
wedges. On the left axis is the collateral scarcity measure m˜y (solid blue line). On the right axis is the standard
deviation (or mean) (across regions) of the wedges (dashed red line). γ is 2. The sample is 1952-2002 (annual data).
The collateral measure is myrw (residential wealth).
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Figure 2: Housing Collateral Scarcity and Consumption/Income Dispersion in Data.
The left panel plots the regional (non-durable) consumption share dispersion. The right panel plots the ratio of
regional (non-durable) consumption share dispersion to regional income share dispersion. On the left axis is the
collateral scarcity measure m˜y (solid blue line). On the right axis is the observed cross-sectional consumption share
dispersion (dashed red line) and the ratio of observed cross-sectional consumption share dispersion to income share
dispersion (dashed red line) . The sample is 1952-2002 (annual data) for 23 MSA’s. The collateral measure is myrw
(residential wealth).
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Figure 3: Aggregation to Regional Consumption and Income Shares.
The full lines are the consumption shares and the dashed lines are the income shares. The horizontal axis denotes
time in years. The upper panel plots a simulated time path for two households in the same region. The income share
for household j in region i that is plotted is ˆˆηijt ηˆ
i
t. The second panel plots the regional consumption shares (full line)
against the regional income share (dashed line). The shocks xt, yt are the same for both plots. The bottom panel
plots the consumption shares for the same regional shocks yt, but averaged across xt, by simulating 1000 regions.
The preference parameters are γ = 2 and ε = 0.5.
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Figure 4: Income Elasticity of Consumption Share Growth and the Housing Collateral
Ratio.
The filled dots denote different stationary equilibria for the benchmark case with β = .95, each for a different
collateral ratio my (denoted on the horizontal axis). For each collateral value my on the grid, consumption and
income shares are generated by simulating the model for 600 periods and 1000 regions. The upper panel plots
the regional consumption-to-income dispersion ratio. The middle panel shows the income elasticity of regional
consumption growth (‘slope’). The bottom panel shows the ratio of housing wealth to labor income. The parameters
are γ = 2, ² = .5, β = .95.
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Figure 5: Cutoff Weights and Aggregate weight shock.
The filled dots denote different stationary equilibria for the benchmark case with β = .95, each with a different
collateral ratio my; the empty dots denote the case of β = .9, and the + denote the case of β = .85. The horizontal
axis denotes the collateral ratio my. The upper panel plots the cutoff consumption weight $() in the highest state.
The lowest panel plots g. The parameters are γ = 2, ² = .5, β = .95. The full line plots the standard deviation of
household income growth. For each collateral value my on the grid, consumption and income shares are generated
by simulating the model for 600 periods and 1000 regions.
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Figure 6: The Quantity Anomaly at the Regional Level.
The filled dots denote different stationary equilibria for the benchmark case with β = .95, each with a different
collateral ratio my; the empty dots denote the case of β = .9, and the + denote the case of β = .85. The horizontal
axis denotes the collateral ratio my. The upper panel plots the standard deviation of regional consumption growth.
The full line plots the standard deviation of regional income growth. The lowest panel plots the standard deviation of
household consumption growth. The parameters are γ = 2, ² = .5, β = .95. The full line plots the standard deviation
of household income growth. For each collateral value my on the grid, consumption and income shares are generated
by simulating the model for 600 periods and 1000 regions.
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Figure 7: Housing Collateral Scarcity and Moments of Wedges in Model.
The left panel plots a simulated time path for T = 500 of the collateral scarcity measure (solid line) against the
standard deviation of regional consumption wedges (dashed line). The right panel plots a simulated time path for
T = 500 of the collateral scarcity measure (solid line) against the mean of consumption wedges (dashed line). The
right axis shows the scale of the collateral scarcity measure m˜y. The left axis shows the scale of the consumption
wedge moments. The preference parameters are: β = .95, γ = 2 and ε = 0.5. The mean of my is 10 percent, the
mean of m˜y is .71 in this simulation.
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Figure 8: Housing Collateral Scarcity and Consumption/Income Dispersion in Model.
The left panel plots a simulated time path for T = 500 of the collateral scarcity measure (solid line) against
the regional consumption dispersion (dashed line). The right panel plots a simulated time path for T = 500 of
the collateral scarcity measure (solid line) against the ratio of regional consumption dispersion to regional income
dispersion (dashed line). The right axis shows the scale of the collateral scarcity measure m˜y. The left axis shows
the scale of the consumption dispersion measure. The preference parameters are: β = .95, γ = 2 and ε = 0.5. The
mean of my is 10 percent, the mean of m˜y is .71 in this simulation.
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Figure 9: Consumption Dispersion and the Collateral Ratio in Model.
Scatter plot of the collateral scarcity measure m˜y (horizontal axis) against the regional consumption share dispersion
(vertical axis) for T = 15000. The mean consumption share is one. The preference parameters are: β = .95, γ = 2
and ε = 0.5. The mean of my is 10 percent and the mean m˜y is .71.
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Figure 10: Consumption Dispersion and the Collateral Ratio in Data.
Scatter plot of the collateral scarcity measure m˜y (horizontal axis) against the regional consumption share dispersion
(vertical axis). The mean consumption share is 1/23. The sample is 1953-2002 (annual data) for 23 MSA’s. The
collateral measure is myrw (residential wealth). The mean m˜y is .48 in the data.
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Figure 11: Collateralizable Wealth.
Plot of the ratio of the value of outstanding household mortgages divided by total labor income (full line) and the
ratio of residential wealth to total labor income (dotted line). The sample is 1980-2002 (annual data).
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Table 1: Quartiles.
Quartiles ranked from high to low collateral scarcity. The sample is 1975-2000 (annual data). All results are for 23
US metropolitan areas sorted each year into quartiles based on that period/region’s collateral scarcity measure
m˜yit. The first column reports the average collateral scarcity overt the sample for each quartile. The second column
reports the standard deviation of average population-weighted non-durable consumption growth in each quartile.
The third column reports the correlation with real per capita US non-durable consumption growth (NIPA). The
fourth column reports the slope coefficient in a time series regression of average population-weighted consumption
share growth on average population-weighted income share growth for each quartile. The fifth and sixth columns
reports the t-stat and regression R2.
m˜yi std(∆ log(cit)) corr(∆ log(c
i
t),∆log(c
a
t )) Slope [t-stat] R
2
1 0.842 0.033 0.257 0.659 [1.896] .13
2 0.577 0.032 0.233 0.354 [0.987] .04
3 0.407 0.018 0.278 0.472 [1.757] .11
4 0.226 0.028 0.502 0.319 [1.283] .06
Table 2: Income Growth Elasticity of Consumption Shares in Data
In panel A we estimate: ∆ log
 
c˜it+1

= ai0 + a1m˜yt+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + ν
i
t+1. In panel B we estimate: ∆ log
 
c˜it+1 =
bi0 + b1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + b2myt+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + ν
i
t+1. Rows 1-2 are for the period 1952-2002 (1166 observations). The
measure of idiosyncratic income is disposable personal income. Rows 3-4 are identical to rows 1-2 but are for the
period 1970-2000 (713 observations) in panel A and 1970-2002 (759 observations) in panel B. Regressions 5-6 use
labor income plus transfers, available only for 1970-2000. In each block, the rows use the variables myrw and
myfa, estimated for the period 1925-2002. mymax (mymin) is the sample maximum (minimum) in 1925-2002. The
coefficients on the fixed effect, ai0, are not reported. Estimation is by feasible Generalized Least Squares, allowing for
both cross-section heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Rows 7-8 are the results for the instrumental
variable estimation by 3SLS. Instruments are a constant, log(ηˆit+2), log(ηˆ
i
t+3), log(ηˆ
i
t+4), ∆ρˆ
i
t+2, ∆ρˆ
i
t+3, ∆ρˆ
i
t+4,
log(c˜it+2), log(c˜
i
t+3), log(c˜
i
t+4), and myt+2, myt+3, myt+4. The sample is 1952-1998 (1051 observations). All results
are for 23 US metropolitan areas.
Panel A: Specification I Panel B: Specification II
Coll. Measure a1 σa1 R
2 b1 σb1 b2 σb2 R
2
1 myrw .70 (.05) 6.4 .35 (.03) -.30 (.26) 6.5
2 myfa .75 (.06) 6.9 .36 (.03) -1.74 (.50) 6.8
3 myrw .70 (.03) 4.7 .33 (.02) -.64 (.17) 4.7
4 myfa .78 (.03) 5.0 .37 (.02) -2.12 (.31) 5.0
5 myrw 1.02 (.05) 10.5 .48 (.02) -1.03 (.23) 10.5
6 myfa 1.08 (.05) 10.3 .51 (.03) -1.13 (.30) 10.4
7 myrw .63 (.07) .31 (.04) -.32 (.38)
8 myfa .69 (.08) .32 (.04) -1.75 (.64)
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Table 3: Risk-Sharing Tests with Regional Collateral Measures.
Rows 1 and 2 of the table reports estimation results for ∆ log
 
cˆit+1

= bi0+b1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 +b2X
i
t+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 +ν
i
t+1.
Rows 3 of the table reports estimation results for ∆ log
 
cˆit+1 = b
i
0+b1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 +b2X
i
t+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 +b3X
i
t+1+
νit+1. In row 1, X
i is the region-specific home-ownership rate (575 observations). In row 2 and row 3, Xi = myi is
the region-specific housing collateral ratio (569 observations). It is measured as the residual from a regression of the
log ratio of real per capita regional housing wealth to real per capita labor income, log(hvit)− log(ηit), on a constant
and a time trend. A higher myi means more abundant collateral in region i. In all regressions η is disposable income.
The coefficients on the fixed effect bi0 is not reported. Estimation is by feasible Generalized Least Squares allowing for
both cross-section heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. All regressions are for the period 1975-2000
for 23 US metropolitan areas, the longest period with metropolitan housing data.
Coll. Measure b1 σb1 b2 σb2 b3 σb3 R
2
1 HOi .45 (.02) -.11 (.03) 6.1
2 myi .40 (.02) -.57 (.12) 6.2
3 myi .39 (.02) -.45 (0.14) -0.03 (0.003) 6.6
Table 4: Risk-Sharing Tests with Canadian Data.
In row 1 (panel A) we estimate: ∆ log
 
c˜it+1 = a
i
0 + a1m˜yt+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + ν
i
t+1. In row 2 (panel B) we
estimate: ∆ log
 
c˜it+1 = b
i
0 + b1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + b2myt+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + ν
i
t+1. Rows 1 and 2 use the aggre-
gate collateral measure for Canada myfa. Row 3 (panel B) reports estimation results for ∆ log
 
cˆit+1 =
bi0+b1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 +b2X
i
t+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 +ν
i
t+1. Finally, row 4 (panel C) reports estimation results for ∆ log
 
cˆit+1 =
bi0 + b1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + b2X
i
t+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + b3X
i
t+1 + ν
i
t+1. In rows 3 and 4, X
i is the regional collateral measure
myi in Canadian province i. Both the aggregate and regional housing collateral ratios are measured as the residual
from a regression of the log ratio of real per capita regional housing wealth to real per capita labor income on a
constant and a time trend. The coefficients on the fixed effect, ai0 or b
i
0 are not reported. Estimation is by feasible
Generalized Least Squares allowing for both cross-section heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. All
regressions are for the period 1981-2003 for 10 Canadian provinces. The panel contains 220 observations.
Panel A: Specification I
Coll. Measure a1 σa1 R
2
1 m˜yfa .33 (.03) 36.6
Panel B: Specification II
Coll. Measure b1 σb1 b2 σb2 R
2
2 myfa .15 (.02) -2.03 (.41) 37.3
3 myi .18 (.02) -.83 (.28) 34.9
Panel C: Wealth Effect
Coll. Measure b1 σb1 b2 σb2 b3 σb3 R
2
4 myi .18 (.02) -.78 (0.29) −0.008 (0.002) 35.1
Table 5: Measuring the Average Collateral Ratio
The first line ρh
ρh+y
reports the average ratio of rental income ρh (rental income of persons with capital consumption
adjustment) to labor income y (compensation of employees) plus rental income. The second line reports ρh+d+r
ρh+y+d+r
the average ratio of rental income plus net dividends (d) plus interest payments (r) to labor income plus proprietor’s
income. All series are taken from Table 1.12. National Income by Type of Income (NIPA). The third line rw
y
reports
the ratio of labor income to residential wealth. The residential wealth series is from the Flow of Funds Tables. The
fourth line k
y
reports the ratio of the value of US non-farm, non-financial corporations to labor income (non-farm,
non-financial). The value of non-farm, non-financial corporations is also computed using Flow of Funds Tables.
29-02 46-02
1 ρh
ρh+y
0.046 0.038
2 ρh+d+r
ρh+y+d+r
0.145 0.132
3 rw
y
1.40
4 k
y
3.56
5 k+rw
y
4.96
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Table 6: Prediction errors
This table reports approximation errors in the calculation of first-order Markov stationary equilibria. The sample is
a model-simulated panel for 5000 years (annual data) and 5000 regions with γ = 2, ² = .5 and the AR(1) process for
the non-housing expenditure share in equation (5.6). The mean m˜y is .71 in this sample, the mean my is 10 percent.
discount mean std max min
.95 .002718 .004020 .018938 −.006343
.90 .000091 .003863 .017134 −.011169
.85 .002676 .004741 .016611 −.012598
Table 7: Income Growth Elasticity of Consumption Shares in Model
The sample is a model-simulated panel for 1000 years (annual data) and 100 regions with γ = 2, ² = .5 and the
AR(1) process for the non-housing expenditure share in equation (5.6). Each row corresponds to a different value
of the time discount factor β. In panel A we estimate: ∆ log
 
c˜it+1

= ai0 + a1m˜yt+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + ν
i
t+1. The
first and second columns of panel A report the slope coefficient and the regression’s R2. In panel B we estimate:
∆ log
 
cˆit+1 = b
i
0 + b1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + b2myt+1∆log
 
ηˆit+1 + ν
i
t+1. The three last columns of the table report the
min, max and mean of the collateral ratio myt over the simulated sample. The mean of my is .10 and the mean of
m˜y is .71.
Panel A Panel B Collateral Ratio
discount a1 R2 b1 b2 R2 mymin mymax mean(my)
.95 0.323 0.077 0.385 −1.596 0.077 0.026 0.267 .106
.90 0.542 0.074 0.552 −1.498 0.074 0.034 0.284 .106
.85 0.550 0.068 0.553 −1.434 0.068 0.034 0.266 .106
.75 0.584 0.070 0.628 −1.883 0.071 0.042 0.277 .106
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Table 8: Population and Composition of Metropolitan Areas.
Total population numbers (in thousands) are displayed next to the metropolitan areas. For the Consolidated
Metropolitan areas (CMSA), the constituent MSA’s are listed and the fraction of their population in the total
of the CMSA is shown next to their name. All numbers are from the Regional Economic Information System of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis for the year 2000.
Anchorage (AK), MSA 261 Miami CMSA 3,897
Atlanta (GA), MSA 4,145 Miami, FL 58.1%
Baltimore (MD), MSA 2,557 Fort Lauderdale, FL 41.9%
Boston CMSA 6,068 Milwaukee CMSA 1,691
Boston, MA-NH 58.6% Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 88.8%
Worcester, MA-CT 8.7% Racine, WI 11.2%
Lawrence, MA-NH 6.7% Minneapolis (MN-WI) MSA 2,797
Lowell, MA-NH 5.1% New York CMSA 21,134
Brockton, MA 4.3% New York, NY 45.5%
Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME 4.2% Bergen-Passaic, NJ 6.6%
Manchester, NH 3.4% Bridgeport, CT 0.5%
Nashua, NH 3.3% Dutchess County, NY 1.2%
New Bedford, MA 3.2% Danbury, CT 0.4%
Fitchburg-Leominster, MA 2.5% Jersey City, NJ 3.0%
Buffalo (NY), MSA 1,169 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ 5.6%
Chicago CMSA 9,176 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 5.4%
Chicago, IL 90.3% Nassau-Suffolk, NY 13.5%
Gary, IN 6.9% Newburgh, NY-PA 1.8%
Kenosha, WI 1.6% Newark, NJ 9.9%
Kankakee, IL 1.1% New Haven-Meriden, CT 6.2%
Cincinnati CMSA 1,983 Stamford-Norwalk, CT 0.6%
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 92.6% Trenton, NJ 1.7%
Hamilton-Middletown, OH 7.4% Waterbury, CT 0.5%
Cleveland CMSA 2,946 Philadelphia CMSA 6,194
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 76.4% Philadelphia, PA-NJ 82.4%
Akron, OH 23.6% Wilmington, NC 9.5%
Dallas CMSA 5,254 Atlantic-Cape May, NJ 5.7%
Dallas, TX 67.4% Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 2.3%
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 32.6% Phoenix - Mesa MSA 3,276
Denver CMSA 2,597 Pittsburgh (PA), MSA 2,356
Denver, CO 81.7% Portland CMSA 2,273
Boulder-Longmont, CO 11.3% Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 84.7%
Greeley, CO 7.0% Salem, OR 15.3%
Detroit CMSA 5,463 Saint Louis (MO-IL), MSA 2,606
Detroit, MI 81.4% San Diego (CA), MSA 2,825
Ann Arbor, MI 10.6% San Francisco CMSA 7,056
Flint, MI 8.0% San Francisco, CA 24.6%
Honolulu (HI), MSA 876 San Jose, CA 23.9%
Houston CMSA 4,694 Oakland, CA 34.1%
Houston, TX 89.5% Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 7.4%
Galveston-Texas City, TX 5.3% Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 3.6%
Brazoria, TX 5.2% Santa Rosa, CA 6.5%
Kansas City (MO-KS), MSA 1,782 Seattle CMSA 3,562
Los Angeles CMSA 16,440 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 67.9%
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 58.1% Tacoma, WA 19.8%
Orange County, CA 17.4% Bremerton, WA 6.5%
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 20.0% Olympia, WA 5.8%
Ventura, CA 4.6% Tampa (FL), MSA 2,404
Washington,DC-MD-VA-WV, PMSA 4,948
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Table 9: Comparison With Aggregate US data.
The first column gives the number of households in the metropolitan data set. The second column gives the fraction
of US households that are in the metropolitan data set. The third column gives the nondurable retail sales per
household (in $) in the metropolitan data set (NDS). The fourth column gives the ratio of non-durable retail sales
per household to non-durable consumption per household in the NIPA data (NDC). The fifth and sixth column do the
same for durable sales and consumption (DS and DC). The seventh and eight column give the effective buying income
per household in the metropolitan data set (EBI) and the ratio of the latter to disposable income per household from
NIPA (DI).
Year HH metr. HH NDS NDS to DS DS to EBI EBI to
(000) (%) ($) NDC ($) DC ($) DI
1951 17,623 39.4 3,008 1.23 799 1.36 5,959 1.15
1960 23,080 43.7 3,519 1.22 899 1.26 7,711 1.11
1970 28,332 44.7 4,688 1.09 1,180 1.05 11,936 1.03
1980 36,144 44.7 9,683 1.12 2,660 1.24 24,975 1.00
1990 41,784 44.8 15,418 1.15 5,531 1.37 43,698 0.95
2000 49,379 47.2 24,741 1.30 11,888 1.90 56,566 0.83
Table 10: Comparison With Household Data.
Correlation of household non-durable consumption, durable consumption and income data, aggregated by the CEX
for metropolitan areas and the metropolitan area non-durable and durable retail sales and disposable income data
from S&MM.
MSA Nond.Cons Dur.Cons Income
Washington, DC (PMSA) 0.926 0.660 0.973
Baltimore, MD (PMSA) 0.973 0.791 0.956
Atlanta, GA (MSA) 0.740 0.522 0.944
Miami, FL (CMSA) 0.533 0.399 0.922
Dallas, TX (CMSA) 0.939 0.839 0.917
Houston, TX (CMSA) 0.936 0.955 0.932
Los Angeles, CA (CMSA) 0.836 0.845 0.944
San Francisco, CA (CMSA) 0.921 0.797 0.981
San Diego, CA (MSA) 0.838 0.511 0.961
Portland, OR (CMSA) 0.989 0.932 0.973
Seattle, WA (CMSA) 0.928 0.841 0.935
Honolulu, HI (MSA) 0.858 0.409 0.956
Anchorage, AK (MSA) 0.931 0.601 0.847
New York, NY (CMSA) 0.952 0.727 0.957
Philadelphia, PA (CMSA) 0.812 0.698 0.932
Boston, MA (CMSA) 0.876 0.515 0.799
Pittsburgh, PA (MSA) 0.921 0.759 0.846
Chicago, IL (CMSA) 0.803 0.601 0.953
Detroit, MI (CMSA) 0.960 0.534 0.956
Milwaukee, WI (CMSA) 0.792 0.636 0.949
Minneapolis-St, Paul, MN (MSA) 0.940 0.863 0.972
Cleveland, OH (CMSA) 0.881 0.878 0.956
Cincinnati, OH (CMSA) 0.898 0.864 0.974
St. Louis, MO (MSA) 0.881 0.815 0.945
Kansas City, MO-KS (MSA) 0.958 0.708 0.961
Average 0.881 0.708 0.938
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Table 11: Comparison With Regional Income Data
Correlation of regional disposable income from S&MM and labor income plus Transfers from REIS.
South and West Coeff. Northeast and Midwest Corr.
Washington, DC (PMSA) 0.79 New York, NY (CMSA) 0.84
Baltimore, MD (PMSA) 0.42 Philadelphia, PA (CMSA) 0.82
Atlanta, GA (MSA) 0.73 Boston, MA (CMSA) 0.73
Miami, FL (CMSA) -0.18 Pittsburgh, PA (MSA) 0.57
Dallas, TX (CMSA) 0.63 Buffalo, NY (MSA) 0.77
Houston, TX (CMSA) 0.86 Chicago, IL (CMSA) 0.76
Los Angeles, CA (CMSA) 0.85 Detroit, MI (CMSA) 0.74
San Francisco, CA (CMSA) 0.65 Milwaukee, WI (CMSA) 0.12
San Diego, CA (MSA) 0.75 Minneapolis-St, Paul, MN (MSA) 0.70
Portland, OR (CMSA) 0.57 Cleveland, OH (CMSA) 0.90
Seattle, WA (CMSA) 0.60 Cincinnati, OH (CMSA) -0.23
Honolulu, HI (MSA) 0.84 St. Louis, MO (MSA) 0.54
Anchorage, AK (MSA) 0.80 Kansas City, MO-KS (MSA) 0.57
Phoenix, AZ (MSA) 0.83
Denver, CO (CMSA) 0.67 Average 0.64
Table 12: Median Home Value and Home-Ownership Rate.
The table shows median home values for 1980 and 2000 (in thousands of nominal dollars) and the home ownership
rate for 1980 and 2000. All data are from the US Bureau of the Census, Decennial Survey 1980 and 2000
MSA V80 V00 HO80 HO00
Washington, DC (PMSA) 79.9 178.9 54.3 64.0
Baltimore, MD (PMSA) 51.4 134.9 60.0 66.9
Atlanta, GA (MSA) 47.7 135.3 61.4 66.4
Miami, FL (CMSA) 57.0 126.1 61.5 63.2
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (CMSA) 45.6 100.0 64.7 60.4
Houston, TX (CMSA) 52.8 89.7 59.1 60.7
Tampa, FL (MSA) 39.9 93.8 71.7 70.8
San Francisco, CA (CMSA) 98.4 353.5 55.8 57.8
Los Angeles, CA (CMSA) 87.6 203.3 53.8 54.8
San Diego, CA (MSA) 90.0 227.2 55.1 55.4
Portland, OR (CMSA) 60.8 165.4 63.2 63.0
Seattle, WA (CMSA) 66.0 195.4 63.8 62.9
Honolulu, HI (MSA) 129.5 309.0 49.9 54.6
Anchorage, AK (MSA) 89.2 160.7 56.6 60.1
Denver, CO (CMSA) 69.1 179.5 63.0 66.4
Phoenix, AZ (MSA) 59.2 127.9 68.7 68.0
New York, NY (CMSA) 62.5 203.1 44.2 53.0
Philadelphia, PA (CMSA) 42.2 122.3 67.7 69.9
Boston, MA (CMSA) 52.0 203.0 54.8 60.6
Pittsburgh, PA (MSA) 42.7 68.1 69.0 71.3
Buffalo, NY (MSA) 39.7 89.1 63.7 66.2
Chicago, IL (CMSA) 62.8 159.0 58.5 65.2
Detroit, MI (CMSA) 43.5 132.6 70.2 72.2
Milwaukee, WI (CMSA) 59.2 131.9 61.1 62.1
Minneapolis-St, Paul, MN (MSA) 62.3 141.2 67.2 72.4
Cleveland, OH (CMSA) 52.1 117.9 66.6 68.8
Cincinnati, OH (CMSA) 47.9 116.5 63.8 67.1
St. Louis, MO (MSA) 41.8 99.4 68.2 71.4
Kansas City, MO-KS (MSA) 43.5 104.7 66.4 67.9
Tampa, FL (MSA) 59.9 85.2 73.0 71.0
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